World Food Policy Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2015 | Page 15

World Food Policy

Second, China promotes an
uncertain “aid, business, and trade”
model where the “business and trade”
components seem to increasingly take
the lead as shown by a growing activity
of Chinese companies both on the inputs
side (with development of seeds and
fertilizers supply) and the product side
(with development of purchase networks
targeting specific products such as cotton,
groundnuts, and cassava for export). In
addition, and more and more prominently,
Chinese demonstration centers in Africa
are playing another role: they represent a
source of information aiming at reducing
transaction costs for Chinese companies
with no experience in Africa to establish
themselves on the continent.

Third, Chinese cooperation seems
disconnected from the characteristics of
the African context and far away from a
comprehensive approach of local realities.
The demonstration centers provide a good
example of the tentative dissemination of a
technical package directly inspired by the
Green revolution, focusing on techniques
and inputs without taking into account
imperfect and incomplete factor markets,
providing the latter and additional
public goods only on limited project
basis. China’s relatively blind practice,
disconnected from the agrarian situations
and the overall structural realities, is
an obstacle for broad-based reflections
around the host country’s development
trajectories, in particular related to labor
and labor absorption into agriculture and
the definition of an effective development
model for the agricultural sector. So far,
the few isolated projects are not facilitating
a contribution to the debate on structural
transformation, food security, rural
poverty alleviation, and the development

of a vibrant rural economy.

Lastly, China’s cooperation system
seems to be working in isolation without
any consultation with other donors or
local stakeholders, such as rural producers’
organizations or NGOs. This gap with
other players has prevented experience
and information sharing, adaptation to
local realities, and undermines Chinese
aid effectiveness and its contribution to
major African challenges. Particularly, this
disconnection prevents learning from the
Chinese experience and from engaging a
dialogue about how China did manage its
rural transformation and reach its food
security.

In a context where donors are
progressively re-engaging in support
to policymaking processes, following
a growing focus of African institutions
on strategies—and a rising concern
about implementing a “transformative
agenda” (e.g., African Union, AfDB,
and ECA)—Chinese cooperation could
possibly initiate a progressive implication
in support to policies toward rural
transformation and food security. This
move would be a major shift with regard
to a long-lasting positioning favoring
non-interference. This possible evolution
is demonstrated by the implication of
Chinese experts in agriculture policy
design as in Benin, Botswana, and Bissau
Guinea. A similar development is observed
in Mauritania, where experts contributed
to the development of a research center
dedicated to agricultural policy, or in
Senegal where technical assistance is
provided to the ministry of agriculture.
Lately, at an international level, it has
also engaged in a dialogue with other
official donors over the last years, mainly
multilateral channels. This is particularly
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