World Food Policy Volume 2, Number 1, Spring 2015 | Page 13

World Food Policy

Three models of cooperation can
be identified.12 The first one, representing
the major cooperation model adopted by
China, is related to China’s agricultural
demonstration centers, through which
they tend to present a combination
of “aid, business, and trade.” As such,
the model articulates itself around the
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM—
who is providing financial aid), Chinese
provincial companies implementing
the
demonstration
centers,
and
international trade with China which
is developing with imports of (hybrid)
seed, phytosanitary inputs, fertilizers,
agricultural machinery—as well as, in
certain cases, the export of agricultural
produce. These centers are relatively
young: they were decided during the 2006
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) and financed at different
paces. For the 25 centers planned, most
constructions are engaged (offices, labs,
post-harvest facilities, lecture rooms,
etc.), additional rural development
operations (irrigation systems, roads,
etc.) have been initiated, and 10 centers
are already effectively functioning (see
annex). In these centers, experts often
coming from the very same province per
host country/center (for example Hubei
in Mozambique) have been deployed,
although effective capacity building and

dissemination is still often lacking.13
After the establishment (financed by
MOFCOM), first experimentations and
then capacity and dissemination phases
(co-financed by MOFCOM and the
host country research/capacity building
bodies), subsequent phases focus on
rendering the centers financially autosufficient and autonomous and, finally, on
the transfer to host authorities. As such,
these demonstration centers characterize
an effective but fragile cooperation tool
because without Chinese Government
support their financial sustainability is
not guaranteed.14 This cooperation model
is also unclear. For example, in the case
of Cameroon, capacity transfer activities
are articulated with an investment
company — Shanxi Overseas — in which
the primary mandate is profit generation
but is also supposed to finance activities
related to China’s cooperation.

A second model is piloted by
public/private enterprises15 in charge of
developing agricultural projects, such
as Sinochem in Cameroon producing
natural rubber, or Sinto in Togo
producing sugar. Although not massive as
it is in infrastructures, this project-based
cooperation in agriculture is growing
and is rapidly diversifying. Indeed, the
interventions are presently focusing on
an increasing number of agricultural

12

This analysis is based on a joint AFD-Cirad research project focusing on Western and Southern Africa which resulted in the development of a database of 250 public and private projects in agriculture
financed by Chinese funds (Gabas and Ribier 2015a; 2015b).
13
Number of experts is around 10 by center. In Mozambique, the “oldest” center, training and extension
already started (with 10 staff), while operations will only start in 2015 in Cameroon (15 experts are
expected).
14
Principles, development, funding, and replicability lack of evaluation.
15
The distinction between the public or private character of these enterprises is difficult.

12