Vermont Bar Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 Vermont Bar Journal, Winter 2017, Vol. 43, No. 4 | Page 35

not distinct . For example , one can hardly have emotional “ understanding ” without emotional “ perception ” ( else there is nothing to “ understand ”). Muir seems to recognize this in her useful summary of the four components ( Muir , 52-68 ) and their interrelationships . Emotional perception is the “ recognition of the emotions of ourselves and others ” ( sometime referred to as emotional awareness or clarity ). Emotional empathy may be the most important of the four components ( since emotional perception / understanding without empathy likely would not lead to productive action ), and focuses both on cognitive empathy ( the ability to understand the feelings of others ) and emotional empathy ( perhaps an even more valuable ability to feel what others are feeling ). Emotional understanding “ rests on examining the information gleaned from accurately perceived emotions … and our experiences of emotional empathy .” Emotional regulation focuses on regulating ( i . e ., controlling or at least moderating ) “ our internal emotional experiences and also our emotionally driven behaviors ….” These components are , in a way , facets of the same overall activity ( let ’ s call it “ effective behavior ”) and cannot be viewed in insolation . Doing so is somewhat akin to breaking down the activity of walking into balance , muscle strength , brain interaction , and foot strike---all necessary components but ultimately part of what needs to be an integrated process .
How does any of this relate to lawyering and the problems facing our profession ? Muir presents a strong case that lawyers tend to be deficient in EI , and that the sort of rational , non-emotive training lawyers receive tends to make these deficiencies worse . Undoubtedly , lawyering is presented to lawyers , lawyers in training , and the public as a rational , non-emotional profession , and that , as a result , one would expect the best and most successful lawyers to be highly skilled in suppression of emotions and rumination ( Muir , 64-67 ). To cite the immortal Aristotle as quoted in Legally Blond , “ the law is reason free of passion .” 7 But Muir points out that this comes with a price , termed “ emotional labor ,” and may lead to problems such a low resilience ( endemic in lawyers ) and , Muir agrees , may lead to ( or at least be associated with ) the behavioral and psychological problems highlighted in recent reports .
There is a surfeit of bad news for lawyers in Muir ’ s book , but also some potentially good news . First , the bad : lawyers as a group score poorly on EQ tests . Lawyers have typically above average IQs ( in the 115 to 130 range ) but our average scores on EQ tests are reported , “ anecdotally ” at least , as in the 80 to 95 range ( Muir , 42 ). According to Muir , lawyers do even worse at EQ than do doctors , who come in right
at 100 , the national average , which must come as a shock to most lawyers , who tend to view doctors as even more arrogant and non-insightful than lawyers . Muir amusingly points out that the typical lawyer response to this is to challenge the validity of the concept of EI or of the underlying data . Just by way of comparison , there is the somewhat puzzling report that CEOs tend to have even lower EQs than doctors or lawyers , though high-EQ CEOs outperform low-EQ CEOs . Muir also points out that , among the four EI components , lawyers are typically weakest at emotional perception ( we are emotionally “ tone-deaf ”) and strongest at emotional understanding ( which is , at root , a cognitive skill , our area of strength ). This perhaps makes sense if we view the selection of law as a career as a choice indicating a fundamental level of comfort with cognitive functions and discomfort with emotions .
The good news for lawyers is two-fold . First , unlike IQ , which some argue is relatively fixed and thus not subject to improvement , EI proponents believe EI skills can be learned , at least to some degree . 8 This hopeful assessment does not seem to be based on rock-solid evidence , though Muir and others cite anecdotal evidence in support of their view . One would tend to think that if EI skills are teachable at all , they would be teachable to younger , more openminded practitioners , rather than to the battle-hardened cynics now inhabiting the partnership ranks in “ Biglaw .” This dovetails with evidence that successful people ( i . e ., the wealthy--- think Miranda Priestly in The Devil Wears Prada ) tend to have less developed EI skills than the general population ; after all , the rich person being driven about in a town car has less need of other people ( other than as subordinates ) in daily life and is sheltered from perilous interaction with the outside world . Conversely , there is some evidence that street people , of necessity , have more advanced EI skills developed in order to enable the individual to identify and deal with risks on the street .
The second piece of good news is that Muir cites considerable support for the view that lawyers with better developed EI skills tend to outperform their less EI-skilled peers . In thinking about this , we can first reflect on what initially seemed to me to be counterintuitive information brought forward by Bill Henderson , a law professor at Indiana University . Henderson found that the most successful lawyers in “ Biglaw ” tend not to be the law review gunners but the solid-citizen B students . On first blush , this seems surprising , since we view lawyering skills as highly cognitive and therefore likely to be closely reflected by academic performance or even LSAT scores . But Henderson has found , based on extensive review of lawyer performance , that “ the
single best predictor of high performance is ‘ fearlessness ,’ which is the willingness to take on difficult tasks and not be worried about failure or being judged by others .” 9 This concept of “ fearlessness ” is similar to the now-popular concepts of resilience ( noted by Muir to be of short supply in lawyers ) and “ grit .” 10
Muir focuses on four ways in which EI builds more successful law practices ( Muir , 169-249 ). In many respects , this is the guts of Muir ’ s book — making that the case that EI really works in demonstrable ways . Muir repeats the somewhat counterintuitive claim that the presence of EI skills is “ the most accurate indicator of who will emerge from a group as a leader ” ( Muir , 173 ). If one were ever fortunate enough to observe “ Biglaw ” managing partners in action , one might tend to question that proposition . The tricky part of this claim is not to overstate it . High EI skills will not likely lead to great success in law or other highly cognitive areas ( e . g ., astrophysics or , say , coding , viewed as quintessentially non-emotive skills ) in the absence of the requisite skill set ( the so-called “ price of admission ”). But among the cohort meeting that set of requirements ( for law , IQ in the 110-130 range ), so goes the argument , factors like EI , “ fearlessness ,” “ grit ” and the like may be deciding factors . Muir presents interesting arguments ( and data ) to support the claims that ( 1 ) leaders with higher EI skills are more effective ; ( 2 ) EI helps to build a more productive culture ; ( 3 ) EI lowers liability risks ; and ( 4 ) practices exhibiting EI tend to be more profitable .
It likely goes without saying that there are many critics of the EI movement . For example , in a volume summarizing the various academic criticisms of the EI theory , one set of critics strongly argues that General Mental Ability ( GMA ) “ has been found to be the best predictor of job performance in many jobs ” and that “ there can be little argument that GMA is the best overall predictor of task performance , and that EI may not add much incremental validity here .” 11 GMA seems to be largely comparable to IQ , and refers to “ general information processing abilities on which individuals differ .” Muir argues that GMA is a dated concept , and corresponds more closely to basic functional skill ( say , that of a clerk rather than a law firm partner ). If EI is a valuable concept , the proof for lawyers will be in the practical areas which Muir discusses as to the ways EI helps produce better lawyers and better practices . And that , in turn , may depend on how , and to what extent , EI is teachable or can be improved . Muir discusses this to some extent in a chapter focusing on how one can “ raise ” one ’ s EI ( Muir , 343-373 ) but the issue seems to call out for its own workbook , set of specific developmental exercises or other training methods .
Book Review
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