Vermont Bar Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 Vermont Bar Journal, Fall 2018, Vol. 44, No. 3 | Page 19

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sion. This is another indication of the tension
that separates the branches, and the way the
balance can shift.
The Vetoes of the Twenty-First Century
Since the century began, Governors Dean,
Douglas, Shumlin, and Scott have vetoed a
total of 33 bills. Two were overridden, includ-
ing the 2009 veto of the civil marriage bill by
Governor Douglas, based on conscience and
redundancy with the civil union law, 49 and his
veto of the state budget in the same year,
predicting a deficit in revenues that could
not support the proposed appropriations. 50
The vetoes are commonly issued to high-
light differences in state policy between the
executive and the legislature. This will cost
too much, or require higher taxes. This one
will kill jobs or hurt small business. Com-
pared to other states, this one would make
Vermont look too indulgent or too restrain-
ing, a spendthrift or a miser.
Vetoes don’t often reflect political differ-
ences, and Governors who enjoy majorities
in both chambers of their party are not nec-
essarily less likely to veto legislation than
those whose political affiliations are in the
minority of the House and Senate.
THE VERMONT BAR JOURNAL • FALL 2018
The 2018 session of the legislature ended
with a pair of vetoes of the state budget by
Governor Scott, requiring a recessed session
and tense negotiation before a budget was
finally adopted and not vetoed by the Gover-
nor. This is the first time in Vermont’s history
that a bill has been vetoed twice. With nine
vetoes in his first term alone, Scott shows
promise of becoming the leading contend-
er for the prize of Vermont’s greatest vetoer.

A Rich Source of
Constitutional Precedent
terms, wholly unnecessary to reasonable in-
terpretation.” 47
The House or Senate Clerk does not de-
liver the bills to the Governor on the day fi-
nal action by the legislature is taken, once
adjournment has occurred. There is a neces-
sary delay in paperwork, and over the last 50
years there has been a practice of keeping
the bills until the Governor’s office requests
them, so that the five days for pocket vetoes
would not run until that time. In some years,
delivery has been delayed until the Gover-
nor can find an occasion for a signing cer-
emony. In June of 1994, House Clerk Don-
ald Milne concluded that Governor Howard
Dean had abused the privilege of holding
legislation until the Governor wanted to sign
it, and delivered 18 bills to the Governor’s
office all at once, rather than waiting for an
invitation. 48 That dramatic event, later miti-
gated by agreement, underscored the prac-
tical machinery of Section 11, and the col-
lision of branches in the legislative process.
The increasing use of the pocket veto
led to a change in the time of adjournment.
Rather than ending the session, the legisla-
ture regularly recesses for a few weeks after
finishing its session to be able to respond to
vetoes, without the need for a special ses-
Since the veto’s inception, twenty-six bills
were vetoed because the Governor conclud-
ed they violated the U.S. or Vermont Con-
stitutions. The most common objection was
citing a violation of the separation of pow-
ers clause, Section 5 of Chapter II. Governor
Stickney labeled the 1900 bill to incorporate
the Central Vermont Railroad as “unconstitu-
tional” because it was “an endeavor to set-
tle by legislation conflicting claims which are
purely judicial questions and properly deter-
minable in the courts where the interests of
all the parties can be equitably conserved
and protected. His was the only veto of the
26 constitutionally-based vetoes to be over-
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