Vermont Bar Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 Fall 2014, Vol. 40, No. 3 | Page 18

Ruminations: Royce Dynasty

tice’s courts than of higher tribunals.”27 The
legislature finally relieved judges of the discomfort of having to rule or sit on appeals
of their own decisions in 1857.28
In the totality of the cases he heard in his
appellate function, Stephen dissented only
three times. Once he dissented without explaining his objections.29 In Edgell v. Stanford (1831), he disagreed with
the rule as adopted by a majority of
the court [by which] the mortgagee,
being unable to produce on trial a note
or other demand precisely like that described in the deed, is at once defeated of his whole security. I am not prepared to admit, that for such a cause
as this the execution of the mortgage
should be treated as a nugatory act;
or that the hazard and expense of taking measures to correct the mistake,
should be transferred from the party
who executed the deed to him who
received it. And it appears to me to
be more consonant to acknowledged
principles, as it surely is to the justice
of the case, to regard the mortgage
deed as containing a description of the
debt not liable in this action to be controverted, unless for fraud or positive
illegality, than by means of this requisition upon the plaintiff to enable the
defendant to avoid his deed, in consequence of a blunder which his own inattention or design must have chiefly
contributed to produce.30
In Fisher v. Cobb (1834), Stephen dissented
on the grounds that the defendant had no
notice of the action and so should not be
affected by it.31
In Keith v. Ware (1831), Stephen found
the use of “Jr.” inessential in pl XY[