The World Explored, the World Suffered Education Issue Nr. 30 May 2020 - Page 19

observation but is not a fundamental characteristic of ethical action. In Aristotelian terms, the Christian is engaging in a deliberation process with all the complexity presented in Aristotle's theory without finding the circumstances in which to perform his virtuous deeds. He may not be thinking autonomously and both Aristotle and Kant would object to this feature of the deliberation process and condemn it for being in some sense involuntary deliberation. Kant saw the need to claim ethical deliberation be free from dogma and authoritarian indoctrination but was able to retain his faith in a religious/philosophical God that functioned in a manner very similar to Plato's idea of the Good from the Republic and also very similar to the Aristotelian God continually contemplating the essences or forms of the world. When we contemplate in a state of faith we are also capable of contemplating essences. This is particularly the case in our contemplation of ethical "forms" where the idea of God is evoked to ensure that we feel happy about being worthy of happiness as a consequence of our virtuous intentions and actions. The idea of Freedom, for Kant, however, in many ways replaced the religious idea of God and this signalled the Enlightenment's conviction of the importance of political society in the developing of our rational potential (an idea he shared with Plato and Aristotle). Kant's vision of a Cosmopolitan world suggests that he was not impressed with the idea of the nation-state set forth in 1648 (The Treaty of Westphalia) and this is a major difference between Kantian and Aristotelian ethical/political theorising. In his eyes, the nation-state may have been a necessary stage on the road of our ethical and political evolution but it was not by any means the terminus of the process. Individuals need to find themselves in political environments where they are free to organize their souls in a manner appropriate to an imagined state of affairs in which each subject/citizen exercises their judgment in approving the laws of their community as mirroring the rationality of their own thoughts about the law. This for Kant was a state of affairs one hundred thousand years in the future which would replace the authority of the commandment system of religious systems: a state of affairs in which the organisation of the souls of the citizens was absolutely in accordance with the demands of rationality. The formulations of the categorical imperatives also provided us with a description and explanation of fully ethical forms of behaviour that were logically universal and could function as logical justifications of the forms of virtuous behaviour Aristotle discussed in his ethical theory. Lear regards the categorical imperative morality of Kant as being all too formal but omits to mention the second very descriptive and concrete formulation: "So act that you can treat people never merely as means but also as ends in themselves". This is very concrete in its description of how one ought to act towards one neighbours and others, and could easily be seen to be a consequence of Aristotle's virtue theory. Kant and Aristotle would have agreed on how to use logic to clarify many of their ethical positions, in particular, the justification of ought statements such as "We ought to keep promises" in terms