What is it that needs to be detected? Why are we seeking to detect low, slow, and possibly recreational drones? Are we afraid of the platform, vehicle, payload, sensors, use of the data? Are we more worried about aerial drones as opposed to terrestrial, amphibious, or submersible drones? Are we more worried about UAS as opposed to our phone and internet searches? What method(s) should we employ when intercepting or interdicting a drone – kinetic, electronic, both? Even if I’m successful in making a kill of the platform, how do I gain control or take control of the data collected, if any? When do we need to detect? And when do we need to interdict? How does detection help if there’s no viable interdiction/interception capability? How do I know the UAS will respond to the countermeasure when the system to be countered was not manufactured or cobbled together using standardized processes or systems? Where might I want to consider positioning counter-UAS capabilities, or do we consider everywhere a risk? What sort of vulnerability or threat assessment will be used? Do I share this with local law enforcement? Who should be the ones employing this technology? If a private operator detects it, can they respond? What are the rules of engagement for law enforcement, private military companies, corporate security providers? Is the possible liability associated with collateral damage from and interdicting a ‘rogue drone’ more acceptable than the collateral damage from doing nothing? Who decides? Chief Security Officers are frantically doing internet searches and speaking to industry colleagues on what system is the right counter-UAS to achieve their goals. Search engine optimization makes ‘finding’ a solution easy. Yet, how do CSO’s actually know what works and what doesn’t? While the US Government is getting closer to putting money behind funding the type of research, testing & evaluation, and simulations necessary to build a playbook on best practices both for the beneficial uses that UAS can provide to those in charge of ensuring operational continuity, safety, and security in CONUS environments, and the sufficient criteria for determining what, how, when, who, where, and why to use counter UAS – today’s landscape remains pretty barren. Also, what about enterprises – private and public – that have OCONUS operations? This begs the question, what role can and should the private sector play with respect to demonstrating that their products and systems are viable, reliable, and accurate? How much data is needed to demonstrate an acceptable amount to ensure defensible decision-making?
The outlook is not grim, but it is complex. There is room for private-public cooperation to help build out the operational frameworks necessary for reliably using drones in the pursuit of safety and security as well as for counter-UAS technologies.
Melissa S Hersh is a Washington D.C.-based risk analyst and consultant, Principal, Hersh Consulting, LLC. Michael Hopmeier is President of Unconventional Concepts, Inc., an engineering and policy consulting firm specializing in national security issues. He is also a consultant and senior advisor to numerous government agencies and organizations. Views expressed are their own.