it was when the zero-sum game of
Capitalism
versus
Communism
dictated almost every single foreign
policy decision.
As stated earlier, Russia has what it
perceives as legitimate security
interests in setting buffer states around
its borders as a means to deter an
invasion, and Ukraine is no exception.
It is essentially the last remaining
buffer state to its west that has not
fallen into an alliance with NATO.
Furthermore, Europe continues to rely
on Russian fuels to feed its power-
hungry economy, and 28.8% of its
energy imports came from Russia in
2013. Many of those fuels arrive in
Europe via Ukrainian pipelines and
maintaining
control
over
the
distribution of Russia’s most prized
asset is something they are not willing
to relinquish. Given these points, the
Russian message seems to be that
Ukraine is too much of an important
card to lose and that it will take a stand
here, just as it did in Georgia in 2008.
Another conflict where Russia is
showcasing its military might is in the
Syrian Civil War. The fact that Russia
ran to the aid of embattled President
Assad surprised many, yet the
reasoning behind it is not difficult to
grasp. Since then, the Syrian battlefield
has transformed itself at a very hasty
pace. First, Russia has many
geopolitical interests in Syria. Syria
hosts Russia’s only naval base in the
Mediterranean, which serves as a
symbol of pride for the Russians. It is
an inherited legacy from the Cold War
days, and although its infrastructure is
arguably limited at best, it does serve as
a repair station for Russian warships.
Furthermore, Assad is a longtime ally
of Russia, perhaps the last one it has
in the Middle East, and Russia was not
ready to lose that just yet. Also, it is
Russia’s interest to crush the Islamist
insurrections in Syria and leave Assad
in a powerful position to keep them in
check. To achieve the latter, Syria will
soon be needing to restack its weapon
supplies, a lucrative contract Russia is
drooling over as a means to
counterbalance
its
economic
dependence on exporting energy. Last
but not least, the involvement of Russia
in Syria provides an opportunity for
much needed press aimed at
distracting every-day Russians from
the perils of a shaky economic
downturn. It also sends a clear message
to the world: Russia is back as a
worldwide force to take into account.
The Cold War did not really end in
1989. Infamous Cold War terms, such
as perestroika and glasnost, failed to
live up to their connoted expectations
of peace and prosperity essentially
because of Washington’s inability to
adapt its foreign policy to a post-Cold
War world. Or perhaps it was due to
Cold War 2.0