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curity and prepare for longer-term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural stability.” Cole and Hsu, Guiding Principles, 11-232; The United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit,
The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation (2014) (London: UK
Stabilization Unit, 2014), http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/publications/
stabilisation-series/487-uk-approach-to-stabilisation-2014/file
(accessed March 19, 2016).
4. As an additional clarification, civil-military coordination refers in this paper to the peer-to-peer bureaucratic relationships
between the DOD and other agencies of the U.S. Government.
It does not address Samuel L. Huntington’s preoccupation with
the dynamics between uniformed officers and the elected and appointed civilian leaders to whom they report. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).
5. Several officials from the State and Defense Departments,
as well as USAID, made this point when interviewed by the author in early 2016. However, I am continuing to use the terms reconstruction and stabilization (or R&S) in this paper to reflect the
historical record and to contrast their past use with new terms
used to describe similar issue areas, such as countering violent extremism, atrocities prevention, defense institution building, security
sector assistance, and transnational organized crime.
6. George W. Bush, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, National Security Presidential
Directive 44 (Washington, DC: The White House, December 7,
2005), http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf (accessed March 19,
2016). NSPD-44 superseded a 1997 presidential decision directive
issued by the Clinton White House to formalize interagency relationships on what it called “complex contingency operations,”
specifically referencing the extant R&S program underway in
Bosnia-Hercegovina. As noted by Dobbins, U.S. stability operations date back at least as far back at the end of World War II,
with several recent examples including Somalia, Haiti, Kuwait,
and Kosovo, as well as Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. William J.
Clinton, Managing Complex Contingency Operations, Presidential Decision Direction 56 (Washington, DC: The White House,
May 1997); James Dobbins, et al., America’s Role in Nation Building
from Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003).

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