can leaders learned over the years , however , these efforts rate among the most complex and least popular foreign policy challenges . 79 No civilian U . S . government agency claims responsibility for reconstruction and stabilization . Even the DOD accepts the leading role reluctantly . American public opinion can swing quickly from demanding intervention in response to some atrocity or disaster , to opposing a lengthy and dangerous commitment of U . S . troops and resources . As a result , R & S activities provoke an almost superstitious reaction among otherwise rational policy makers , as if planning to deal with these contingencies will make them inevitable .
That political backdrop , as well as the nation ’ s current resource constraints , does not invalidate the need for serious reform to address R & S capability gaps . However , it does make wholesale changes to the government ’ s foreign policy infrastructure and budget extremely unlikely . Some contemporary authors and analysts advocate for grand proposals to create a new U . S . office for contingency operations , engineer a Goldwater-Nichols-type reorganization of the interagency , or undertake a massive rebalancing of resources and authorities from the military to civilian agencies . Few expect that such prominent changes can be accomplished by the current political system . The relatively modest recommendations presented in this paper reflect that skepticism .
The civilian foreign affairs agencies have key roles to play in helping to shape and implement R & S lines of effort as part of the U . S . foreign policy toolkit . Their past experience , both positive and negative , has taught valuable lessons and created some key elements of capability to help stabilize and rebuild fragile states , whenever doing so is consistent with
26