The Fate of the Civilian Surge in a Changing Environment | Page 28

bridge the cultural, strategic, and programmatic distance between development assistance and the work
of the DOD. To take one example, the policy specifically directs USAID missions abroad to share CDCS
plans with their military counterparts, and to participate, where possible, in developing DOD country
plans and theater campaign plans.72 Similarly, a 2012
policy instruction from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense instructs senior military officials working as
part of an embassy country team to obtain approval
from the chief of mission and senior USAID representative in country before implementing “developmentlike” activities funded by the DOD’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) and
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) accounts.73
Finally, CMC facilitates staff-level contacts between USAID and the DOD. The office has developed
a training program for military audiences on development assistance and USAID’s role in the national
security community, called “Development in Vulnerable Environments.” It also oversees the selection and
placement of more than a dozen USAID officials annually as students and faculty at professional military
education institutions.74
Despite these positive steps, as wartime coordination recedes and concerns about operational safety persist, civilian agencies will be increasingly unwilling or
unable to play a leading role in response to R&S challenges. New priorities in the Peace and Security realm
such as CVE, transnational organized crime, atrocities
prevention, and defense institution building, provide
new opportunities for interagency collaboration, but
they also absorb most of the limited capacity in this
field. As civilian agencies complete their retreat from
R&S in favor of these new priorities, the DOD must re-

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