The Fate of the Civilian Surge in a Changing Environment | Page 27

concerns about the militarization of foreign assistance and reluctance about coordinating closely with
military officials. Over time, that cultural backlash receded, particularly as USAID staff and implementers
participated in R&S activities in Iraq and Afghanistan
alongside their military colleagues, or received training from OMA/CMC on how to work effectively with
military officials. Perhaps most importantly, personnel hiring policy changes led to an increased number
of military veterans joining the civilian agency’s staff.
These personal interactions helped to break down
stereotypes and reinforce the value of each agency
working in parallel lines of effort to accomplish unified goals.68
As a USAID Crisis, Stabilization and Governance
Officer Benjamin Kauffeld notes,69 his and other civilian agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, have joined the DOS in placing senior advisors
in most of the combatant commands and at the Pentagon, both to influence military decision making and
to help identify, filter, and steer the most legitimate
military requests to the appropriate civilian authority.
Embassy country teams serve as another key point of
convergence between representatives from a range of
civilian agencies and the military liaison teams and
defense attachés serving in each post. In Kauffeld’s
words, in the wake of the recent Iraq and Afghanistan
conflicts, “USAID and DOD have never appreciated
and respected each other’s capabilities better than
right now.”70
The June 2015 “USAID Policy on Cooperation with
the Department of Defense” sought to capitalize on
this new reality.71 Developed by CMC in coordination
with other USAID regional and functional bureaus,
the policy formalizes the previous decade’s efforts to

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