The Fate of the Civilian Surge in a Changing Environment | Page 12

quently, the DOD Joint Forces Command (JFCOM),
and later the Joint Force Development (J7) Directorate
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided substantive assistance to S/CRS in developing its planning, training
exercises, and policy coordination methodologies as
well.13
Yet this new policy arrangement faced entrenched
opposition within the foreign policy bureaucracy,
which in turn complicated its endorsement on Capitol
Hill. Congressional researcher Nina Serafino cites the
dismay within the DOS at the creation of S/CRS, particularly among existing DOS bureaus that claimed responsibility for elements of R&S, including PoliticalMilitary Affairs (PolMil) and International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement (INL).14 In addition, American
University professor Gordon Adams notes that the
powerful DOS regional bureaus, which manage and
coordinate U.S. embassies overseas, resisted the creation of a new office with direct access to the secretary because it threatened their own power within the
bureaucracy.15 Finally, embassies in conflict-affected
countries lacked confidence that S/CRS teams would
add value. In fact, the office’s slow start-up and weak
initial capacity exacerbated these doubts.16 Most notably, policy makers at the DOS and National Security Council (NSC) decided against involving the
fledgling office in Iraq, to prevent it from becoming
overwhelmed by the massive R&S efforts already underway in that country. This arguably sound bureaucratic management decision nevertheless undercut
the office’s political standing within the DOS17 – since
the Iraq R&S challenge was ostensibly the impetus for
NSPD-44 in the first place.18
For its part, USAID supported the DOS lead on
policy coordination and its efforts to improve civilian

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