风险分摊
中国对外投资的交易协议一般解决与第三方融资相关 的风险 , 具体如下 : 买方在签署协议时会声明相应的承 诺函有效 , 而且 , 如果进行了融资 , 其将会有足够资金 进行交易交割 。 买方会同意尽其最大努力获得承诺函 中所述的融资 , 如果无法获得此等融资 , 则会寻求其他 融资 。 买方履行交易交割的义务不会以其获得初期或 其他融资为前提条件 。 交易对象具有单方面终止交易 的权利 , 若买方未能完成交易 , 尽管买方的所有条件均 已满足 , 且投资对象声明其愿意交割 , 交易对象可以要 求买方支付反向解约金 。
若买方因融资失败未能完成交易 , 很多协议明确规 定 , 交易对象不能请求强制履行 , 以强制买方完成交 易 。 投资对象的唯一可以采取的措施是强制履行买方 寻求其他融资 ( 买方可能仍未获得其他融资 ) 的承诺 , 或者终止协议 , 收取反向解约金 。 当融资风险提高时 , 例如当融资方的承诺受到大量条件的限制 , 投资对象 会要求提高反向解约金或交易保费 。
当投资对象特别关注融资风险时 , 中国投资者可以考 虑为融资失败提供更高金额的反向违约金 , 且高于未
When financing risks are heightened , such as when the financing party ’ s commitment is subject to a wide range of conditions , targets demand larger reverse termination fees or a greater deal premium .
When a target is particularly concerned about financing risk , Chinese investors may consider offering a larger reverse termination fee for a financing failure than for the failure to obtain Chinese government outbound approvals . Doing so makes sense if the buyer thinks that its lenders ( in the case of a debt financing ) are highly likely to finance a deal once it has obtained its government approvals . If the likelihood of receiving the approvals but not the financing is small , then so will be the risk of having to pay the higher fee for the financing failure .
ENFORCEMENT RISK : NATURE OF THE RISK
Buyers and targets in Chinese outbound investment transactions must navigate various impediments to making their contracts enforceable , both in theory and in practice . First , China and the United States have yet to execute a treaty providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of court judgments in commercial cases . China is , however , a signatory to the New York Arbitration Convention , which requires
19 THE CHINA INVESTOR