Chapter
1:
Introduction
water
management
–
took
“little
notice
of
complex
and
localized
relationships
between
natural
resources
and
those
who
depend
on
them”
(Moore
2011),
which
caused
traditional
technologies
and
institutions
to
unravel
(Ibid).
Hence,
since
the
1990s,
a
number
of
internationally
promoted
initiatives
took
root,
such
as
the
privatization
of
water
supply
units
in
cities,
a
national
Water
Law,
and
the
support
of
local
initiatives
to
achieve
more
decentralized
and
efficient
forms
of
water
management.
These
initiatives
have
led
to
small
improvements
in
practice
(Taher
et
al.,
2012;
van
Steenbergen
et
al.,
2011),
but
a
more
systematic
analysis
of
the
conditions
for
effective,
decentralized
groundwater
management
in
Yemen
is
very
much
needed.
The
current
economic
incentive
structure
in
Yemen
(including
subsidization
of
diesel)
seems
to
encourage
-‐
instead
of
discourage
-‐
groundwater
extraction
(Hellegers
et
al.,
2011).
Al-‐Shaybani
also
warns
that
some
“forms
of
decentralization
has
multiplied
rather
than
solved
problems”
(Al-‐Shaybani
2005).
Interestingly,
one
can
observe
two
seemingly
contradictory
trends
in
present-‐day
Yemeni
surface
and
groundwater
regimes.
On
the
one
hand,
there
are
ample
reports
that
growing
awareness
of
new
water
regulations
and
increasing
involvement
of
water
user
associations
in
local
water
management
has
led
to
new
informal
rule-‐making
that
often
protects
the
local
community
as
a
whole
rather
than
only
the
elite
(van
Steenbergen
et
al.,
2011).
Yet
there
are
increasing
signs
that
local
water
conflicts
are
steadily
becoming
more
violent
over
the
last
decade
(SAS
2010;
van
Steenbergen
et
al.,
2011).
In
view
of
these
developments,
it
is
necessary
to
further
investigate
these
trends
and
the
nexus
between
existing
conflict
resolution
mechanisms
and
the
escalation
of
new
conflicts.
It
is
assumed
that
a
better
understanding
of
the
political
economy
of
current
Yemeni
groundwater
management
is
a
precondition
for
generating
tailor-‐made
policy
advice
for
more
effective
conflict
resolution.
This
could
radically
improve
water
security
even
under
constrained
conditions
as
found
in
Yemen
and
thus
serve
as
an
important
tool
for
conflict
prevention.
This
research
will
reflect
on
Harold
Lasswell’s
famous
question
“who
gets
what,
when
and
how”
by
reflecting
on
several
themes,
such
as:
•
Who
is
who
in
Yemen’s
water
management?
This
includes
an
analysis
of
who
has
which
strategic
interest
(including
external
donors),
as
well
as
who
are
the
actors
who
have
a
vested
interest
in
water
crisis
perpetuation;
are
there
specific
vulnerable
groups
who
suffer
more
then
others