d. equal
and
fair
(re)
distribution
of
costs,
e. benefits
and
risks,
and
f. conflict
prevention
and
resolution
mechanisms
14. For
all
these
institutional
elements,
all
parties
(i.e.,
the
donor
community,
Yemeni
government,
civil
society,
etc.)
have
to
be
aware
that
it
is
crucial
to
develop
context-‐specific
arrangements.
These
arrangements
should
take
into
account
the
environment
in
which
local
authorities
and
WUAs
have
to
operate,
focusing
on
effective
cooperation
between
them,
the
required
capacity
building
and
training
of
staff,
joint
information
production
and
exchange,
how
to
deal
wi th
corruption,
and
how
to
provide
a
positive
incentive
structure,
which
stimulates
accountability
and
responsiveness.
15. When
common-‐pool
resources
involve
the
interests
of
multiple
stakeholders,
as
in
the
case
of
larger
(cross-‐border)
river
basins
or
groundwater
systems,
an
additional
design
principle
needs
to
be
added
in
order
to
lay
the
foundation
for
a
more
robust
governance
system;
local
parties
only
tend
to
address
the
local
issues,
whereas
national
parties
only
tend
to
address
the
national
priorities.
In
the
case
of
boundary
crossing
common
pool
resources,
both
the
local
and
national
voices
need
to
be
included
in
decision-‐making.
Therefore,
multi-‐level
collective
governance
is
needed.
As
collective
governance
does
not
emerge
spontaneously,
it
should
be
built
upon
traditional
governance
structures,
rather
than
(new
external)
state
structures,
with
active
facilitation
and
promotion.
16. Furthermore,
a
river
basin
approach
can
be
developed
and
implemented
step-‐by-‐step.
In
the
first
step
a
river
basin
approach
can
be
used
to
gather
data
on
water
rights,
current
usage
and
interventions
that
might
have
an
impact
on
the
availability
and
distribution
of
water
(e.g.,
check-‐
dams,
deep
wells).
Projecting
these
figures
onto
the
physical
and
socio-‐economic
change
can
help
to
identify
the
sources
of
conflict,
as
well
as
conflict
solutions.
Support
for
the
Rule
of
Law
If
traditional
approaches
succeed
in
maintaining
and
regaining
their
legitimacy,
they
provide
an
entry
point
for
strengthening
the
rule
of
law
in
the
longer
term.
Already,
in
some
areas
the
traditional
system
partially
filled
the
institutional
vacuum
created
since
2011
and
provided
adequate
solutions.
The
traditional
rule
system
is
a
flexible
system
and
may
adapt,
as
circumstances
require:
in
response
to
the
requirements
of
the
situation,
new
rules
and
practices
have
been
created.
Within
this
research
on
some
occasions,
the
outcome
of
a
conflict
seems
to
result
in
the
establishment
of
new
rules
to
govern
the
practices
(well
spacing,
common
ground,
common
water
resources,
etc.).
It
is,
therefore,
recommended
to
support
the
traditional
and
formal
rule,
by
combining
their
strengths.
17. Assist
the
development
of
a
fund
to
support
access
to
courts
for
the
poorer
populations
of
Yemeni
society.
Needless
to
say,
the
necessary
safeguards
should
be
put
in
place
to
prevent
capture
of
resources.
18. Develop
mobile
water
courts
for
water
related
conflicts.
Mobile
courts,
not
necessarily
related
to
water
conflicts,
have
been
recommended
before
and
attention
should
specifically
be
given
to
their
susceptibility
of
corruption.
Alongside
these
court
rulings,
these
mobile
courts
should
provide
education
on
the
applicable
laws
and
provide
technical
advice
in
relation
to
water
issues
(thereby
facilitating
conflict
resolution
outside
the
courts).
In
this
manner,
the
gap
between
formal
law
and
traditional
law
can
be
bridged
(and
the
legitimacy
of
the
court
rules
can
be
improved)
and
justice
is
made
accessible,
even
for
the
most
disadvantaged
groups.
Mobility
of
the
courts
has
also
the
advantage
that
political-‐economic
connections
of
a
‘crony
capitalist
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