Chapter
10:
Findings
possessed
power
due
to
their
proximity
to
the
regime.
Because
of
these
problems,
most
of
the
described
conflicts
remain
unresolved.
Saleh
strategically
used
‘divide
and
rule
tactics’
to
weaken
any
possible
opposition:
he
rewarded
parties
for
their
loyance,
and
on
the
other
hand
by
dividing
tribes
and
stimulating
tribal
conflicts.
Sheiks
were
deliberately
co-‐opted
by
the
government
to
secure
tribal
loyalty,
which
has
increased
the
dependency
of
sheiks
on
the
95
government
and
less
on
the
tribes.
According
to
one
interviewee,
Saleh
could
reach
this
aim
by
giving
money
and
other
incentives
such
as
power,
jobs,
land,
project
contracts
as
gifts
to
the
people
from
conflicting
tribes
simultaneously.
Also
he
used
to
supply
fighting
tribes
with
arms.
“He
would
allocate
bullets
from
the
same
warehouse
to
two
tribes
in
conflict”.
The
system
and
its
related
challenges
have
persisted
through
the
current
transitional
period.
Incentives
were
always
given
in
return
for
blind
loyalty
to
the
General
People’s
Congress
(GPC)
and
Saleh.
With
money
and
power
Saleh
appointed
local
individuals
as
sheikhs,
while
these
individuals
had
no
status
or
experience
in
customary
law
or
tribal
traditions.
They
then
managed
to
garner
loyalty
and
some
support
through
providing
jobs
and
incentives
to
local
people,
mostly
through
corruption
and
patronage.
This
undermined
the
authority
of
authentic
sheikhs
and
created
competition
with
original
sheikhs
and
divisions
along
tribal
lines.
As
a
result,
many
sheikhs
became
more
concerned
with
power
and
money
and
many
turned
their
back
to
their
communities.
In
some
cases,
sheikhs
were
even
involved
in
“Authority
cannot
take
a
decision
due
to
corruption
in
local
development
projects
and
influential
persons
who
are
benefitting.
services.
The
authority
of
tribal
sheikhs
We
powerless
are
in
constant
struggle
further
declined
through
the
2011
revolution.
with
authority.
There
is
no
funding
for
According
to
the
participants
of