Chapter
5:
Analysis
of
stakeholders
in
Yemen
Their
interests
and
goals,
perceptions
and
knowledge,
and
resources
and
power
in
steering
the
conflict,
characterize
all
these
stakeholders.
Having
access
to
powerful
network
partners
is
in
this
case
can
be
regarded
as
a
power
resource.
But
what
is
important
here
is
that
both
formal
and
informal
institutions
only
act
in
as
far
they
are
recognized
as
legitimate
by
and
influencing
the
behavior
of
the
coalitions
in
conflict.
5.5
Conclusions
This
chapter
opened
with
several
questions.
The
stakeholder
analysis
shows
that
there
is
a
wide
variety
of
public
and
private
actors
involved
in
water
governance
and
thus
in
water
conflicts
in
Yemen.
The
list
of
actors
shown
in
table
5.1
is
unlikely
to
be
comprehensive
and
at
the
local
level
varieties
can
exist
in
levels
of
power
and
interest
(e.g.,
the
NWRA
can
have
much
influence
in
Sana’a,
but
very
limited
in
rural
settings).
The
actors
as
presented
in
this
chapter
are
not
representative
of
homogenous
groups,
but
house
a
great
variety
within.
It
does
show,
and
the
heterogeneity,
the
complexity
of
water
governance
in
Yemen.
The
capacity
of
the
Government
to
implement
water
plans
and
policies
is
limited.
True
influence
in
developing
the
water
systems
rests
with
the
large
private
irrigation
farmers,
who
control
the
lion's
share
of
the
available
water
resources.
The
relation
between
the
private
and
the
public
is
very
complex,
as
many
private
agents
hold
at
the
same
time
also
public
offices.
This
complexity
is
enlarged
by
the
pluriformity
of
regulatory
and
legal
institutions
(state,
tribal,
customary,
and
religious).
As
wealth
is
important
in
influencing
the
development
of
water
resources,
the
poor
(and
women)
are
unequally
affected
by
developments
in
the
water
resources
system.
The
main
stakeholders
in
water
conflicts
are
the
local
water
users.
In
these
conflicts
we
can
recognize
an
accusing
and
an
accused
party
(or
coalition).
Both
these
parties
have
an
interest
in
resolving
the
conflict,
but
both
of
them
have
different
perceptions,
goals,
interests,
resources
and
power
to
steer
the
outcome
of
the
conflict
process.
This
can
result
in
a
situation
in
which
both
parties
are
unable
to
settle
the
conflict.
At
this
stage,
a
third
party
can
be
invited
to
intervene
in
order
to
settle
the
conflict.
Due
to
the
pluriformity
of
the
legal
institutions,
this
third
party
can
be
a
representative
of
the
state
(e.g.,
a
court,
judge,
etc.),
tribal
and
customary
institutions
(e.g.,
sheik,
elderman,
etc.),
or
religious
leader.
Important
is
that
the
authority
(and
the
institution
it
is
representing)
of
the
third
party
is
perceived
as
legitimate
by
both
parties
in
order
to
settle
the
conflict.
With
the
collapse
of
the
Saleh
regime,
political
and
power
structures
have
changed
in
Yemen.
However,
the
political
economy
has
mostly
remained
among
the
same
elite
families.
At
the
same
time,
an
ongoing
process
of
decentralizing
national
institutions
is
underway.
The
real
power,
however,
of
m