PHIL302
to state that the water
itself has no intrinsic value
because it has no interests.
Hank does not affect the
flourishing of the water or
hinder its goals; it still flows
down the mountain and it
is still a liquid. Water may
be necessary to life but the
stream is only sufficient.
The reference to the
ecosystem being harmed
may also be misleading,
for it is only biotic aspects
of the system that were
harmed, and ecosystems
incorporate abiotic entities
too. Therefore, it is life that is
important. If we try to apply
justice to ecosystems it can
only be indirect justice.
Proponents of holism would
disagree. For them we are
all constituents of a whole
that is more important than
the individual, and “the
survival of species and
systems is functionally
necessary
for
the
existence and well-being of
individuals, some would go
further and maintain that it
is ultimately the species and
ecosystems that should be
valued,” (Attfield, 2003, p.8).
An individual’s only value is
what she contributes to the
overall system. This view
attributes only instrumental
value to all sentient and
non-sentient creatures, and
as such denies entitlements
of direct justice to the
individual. Callicotts’s land
ethical-holism
“maintains
that if culling a white-tailed
deer is necessary for the
protection of the holistic
good, then it is a land-ethical
requirement to do so […] the
same point also applies to
human individuals because
they are also members
of the biotic community”
(see Brennan and Lo,
2015). This for me is an
indefensible position for a
normative ethical theory,
and shows the inherent
problems
of
preferring
whole
over
individual.
Again the holism ethic
does not view ecosystems
as living entities or ends
in themselves, so cannot
qualify for considerations of
justice with the criteria we
are using.
References
Attfield,
R.
(2003)
Environmental Ethics. Great
Britain, Polity Press.
It is difficult to generate
the passion to argue
against the concept of
justice for ecosystems,
as they offer spiritual and
aesthetic values along
with instrumental value.
Yet, the thought of placing
intrinsic value on abiotic
aspects of the ecosystem is
incomprehensible. It would
lead to a state of affairs
in which we would not be
able to have any interaction
with the natural wold for
fear of harming it. It would
preclude us from walking up
mountains, for this displaces
rocks and stones and could
be viewed as harming the
integrity of the mountain.
We can see by Hank the
astronaut’s first foray that
there is an intuitive value we
place on life and for me that
is the most fundamental,
and least arbitrary, place
to start when deciding how
humans should interact with
the natural world. If we adopt
a biocentric philosophy
of environmental justice
we will be able to start
saving the biotic aspects of
ecosystems, and through
indirect entitlements to give
justice to the abiotic.
Cahen, H. (1988) ‘Against
the Moral Considerability
of
Ecosystems’.
In,
Environmental Ethics an
Anthology, (2003) Eds. A.
Light, and H. Rolston III.
United Kingdom, Blackwell,
pp. 114-128.
117
Brennan, A., and Lo, Y-S.
(2015)
‘Environmental
Ethics’.
In
Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
(Winter 2015), ed. E. N. Zalta
[Online] Available at http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/
ethics-environmental/,
accessed 01 November
2015.
Clewell, A., F. and Aronson,
J.
(2007)
Ecological
restoration - Principles,
values, and structure of
an emerging profession.
Washington D.C., Island
Press.
Holland, B. (2008) ‘Justice
and the Environment in
Nussbaum’s “Capabilities
Approach” - Why sustainable
ecological capacity is a
meta-capability’,
Political
Research Quarterly, Volume
61, Issue 2, pp. 319-332. S
Nussbaum,
M.
(2007)
Frontiers of Justice. USA,
Harvard University Press.
Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory
of Justice. USA, Harvard
University Press.
Taylor, P. (1986) Respect
for Nature. USA, Princeton
University Press.