SotA Anthology 2015-16
Frontiers of ethics: Do we owe
duties of justice to ecosystems?
The module PHIL302: Frontiers of Ethics looks at conceptual and ethical issues
arising from matters of global concern such as international justice, war, and the
environment. In this essay, selected by the module leader Dr Simon Hailwood,
graduating BA Philosophy student Stephen Kearns considers environmental justice.
Ecological justice is about
the human relationship
with the natural world.
Human beings have had a
detrimental impact upon the
environment, with global
climate change being linked
to CO2 emissions and mass
species-extinction due to
deforestation. Rawls’ (1971)
theory of justice is seen
as a way to get fairness
in society, but as this is
a reciprocal contract, it
cannot be applied to nature.
Therefore, we need to find
a different way to extend
justice to the natural world
in order to curb negative
human impact on nature.
In order to extend justice
to ecosystems, we must
first move beyond the
boundary of exclusivity
of rights for humans
and animals. If justice is
applicable to non-sentient
organisms, then there is a
possibility that ecosystems
could be included; in order
to achieve this, we must
first find grounds for such
a claim. This paper will
argue that justice for nonsentient organisms can
only be achieved through
a biocentric approach. I will
argue that although we can
grant direct claims of justice
to individual organisms,
we can only award indirect
claims for eco-systems.
Martha Nussbaum states
that the mistreatment of
animals is an issue of
justice; we have a duty
to punish acts that cause
suffering, and which in
turn cause compassion in
us. These ‘bad acts’ are
understood as unjust when
a non-human animal has
“a moral entitlement not
to be treated in that way”
(Nussbaum, 2007, p.337). It
follows that the actions that
cause a denial of this moral
entitlement are wrong. For
me, Nussbaum arbitrarily
draws the line for moral
consideration at sentience
and any acceptable ethical
theory cannot be arbitrary.
An individual non-human,
non-sentient living organism
(organism) has a good
of its own if it can be
harmed or benefitted; an
organism then has an
interest in that which is a
good. The interests of most
teleological organisms are
goal-orientated: to sustain
itself, prolong life, flourish
and reproduce, and most
non-sentient
organisms
are homeostatic entities.
It is in having interests
that we can attach intrinsic
value to a non-sentient
organism. The organism
has intrinsic value if it has
non-relational
properties
of value and it is an end in
itself. The key characteristic
for me is life, which is both
necessary and sufficient for
moral consideration. This
view can be considered
value objectivist as it
recognises the value of
life intrinsically and not
through an anthropocentric
projection of value, as is
the case with sentience.
The combination of these
two principles of morality
grounded in interests and
intrinsic value allows us to
see that we ought as moral
agents to value life as an
end in itself and promote
its good, or at the least not
cause it harm. Following
on from Nussbaum’s claim,
a state of affairs is an
injustice if it involves the
denial or interruption of
the teleological goals of an
entity with interests.
This involves a shift from
ethical
anthropocentrism
to biocentrism. If we are
to find a solution to the
environmental problems we
witness presently, then we
need to move away from the
stance that man has a moral
right to exploit nature for his
own ends. This definition
may appear too broad
and make a weak claim,
but that makes it easier to
defend. Significantly, it has