shape their policies, procedures, and perceptions. For example, leaders must understand that
humanitarian organizations will maintain their neutrality between both violent extremist organizations
(VEOs) and our western coalitions despite military perception that our end-state goals are generally
aligned. While we see our liberation of a city from ISIS control as a humane action, they see us as simply
one of the armed actors generating suffering through our armed actions. Strategic leaders must prepare
themselves to collaborate in this environment yet the typical leader, staff, and collective training may
develop personal biases that will impede collective success.
Our understanding of the complementary roles of DOS, USAID, and other interagency
participants as well as the associated funding, authorities, and direction will directly influence the
efficiency and effectiveness of our response. We must be able to speak the language of the community
of interest. Quips about the oxymoronic “UN cluster system” can quickly alienate a military leader from
his international partners, who are committed professional practitioners of the humanitarian trade.
When searching for direction on how to execute missions, Army units turn to doctrine as the “owner’s
manual,” but when it comes to FHA, there is no Army doctrine to guide responses. Instead, soldiers
turn to joint doctrine, NATO doctrine, and DODIs or DODDs, or may sometimes have to resort only
to publicly available best practices and subject matter expert inputs. It is imperative that senior leaders
and key planners are prepared via FHA training and education before the call comes for a unit to deploy.
Commanders and staff planners preparing for an FHA mission must understand the reach-back
capabilities resident in PKSOI-FHA, the Center for Excellence for Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA), OUSD-P, and USAID-OFDA.
The confluence of global trends such as surging migration toward coastal regions, development
of dense urban concentrations in megacities, increasing speed and lethality of pandemics, intensifying
storm patterns and rising sea levels, and growing refugee populations, all signal that the frequency and
scope of DOD demand for FHA responses is likely to increase in the years to come. Strategic leaders
must dedicate the time to prepare before their units are called upon to respond. The lessons learned
captured in this Sampler and throughout SOLLIMS are a valuable aid in that effort. Our country and the
most vulnerable populations around the world will be counting on you to deliver in the direst situations,
while their lives are on the line. Good or bad, they will never forget our response.
COL Morgan (Dan) O’Rourke
Chief, FHA Division
PKSOI
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