Discussion .
In Mali , although sporadic attacks continue to occur , there is no wide-scale threat to the peace thanks in part to : ( a ) military interventions [ by France and the Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS )], ( b ) international mediation , ( c ) UN peacekeeping , and ( d ) various other factors .
“ In response to the crisis , the AU and the Economic Community of West African States ( ECOWAS ) adopted a dual-track approach : dialogue with the MNLA , as well as adopting military intervention . In December 2012 , representatives of the Mali government met with both the MNLA and Ansar Dine , where a ceasefire was achieved . During these talks , both groups agreed to drop calls for independence and the imposition of Sharia law . It should further be noted that as a result of the mediation , legitimate demands by the MNLA were met to an extent , through the Algiers Accord , and the MNLA now has more autonomy in the northern region of Mali . Thereafter , French military intervention was implemented through United Nations Security Council Resolution 2071 to push back insurgent groups who continued to pose a threat to the country . The intervention was successful to some extent , but sporadic attacks continue to take place .” ( Ramdeen , p . 53 )
Key points are : Early mediation efforts were instrumental in preventing further outbreaks of large-scale violence ; major population centers / cities within Mali are no longer threatened ; and , there is room for continued mediation – arguably at the lower levels , targeting various societal groups with unmet grievances .
Nigeria is a different case , yet having one similarity – mediation towards a ceasefire , to prevent further major acts of violence , and to provide space for further dialogue . “ Due consideration should also be given to mediation attempts in Nigeria . Indirect peace talks were considered in 2012 , during which Boko Haram considered a ceasefire . As Reuters reported : ‘ It is the first time a ceasefire had been mentioned , so it is a massive positive , but given the lack of trust , a resolution is still a way off .’ Talks resumed in 2015 , when President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria met with Boko Haram members … with hopes that it would lead to further peace talks in the future .” ( Ramdeen , p . 53 )
In the cases of Nigeria and Mali , where a ceasefire discussion was part of mediation efforts , the conflict may not have been resolved , but at least an outbreak of major violent conflict was prevented . Certainly , a major issue / challenge of mediating with an armed group ( or spoiler , or extremist actor ) is that it may give the impression that the mediators or host nation authorities are somehow conceding to the armed group or showing weakness . On the other hand , this challenge can be met by emphasizing that the mediation seeks to first acknowledge the parties having grievances , but also by conveying a strong / ultimate will to end / resolve the conflict , putting ideology aside .
Acknowledging that no two mediation situations are alike – with each one having its own unique history , stakeholders , armed groups , grievances , etc . – the case of Colombia is , however , proof of what can be achieved through persistent , long-haul , and “ inclusive ”
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