“ Stabilization ” is at the core of the MINUSMA mandate .
“… in stabilization , the theory of change is to restore and maintain order by managing or containing aggressors and spoilers . … in peacekeeping the aim is conflict resolution , whilst in stabilization the objective is limited to conflict management or containment . … The typical UN peacekeeping missions , and the units , trained , prepared and equipped to do consensual peacekeeping , are not capable of the kind of ‘ robust ’ operations these stabilization mission require .” ( 1 )
In the case of stabilization for Mali , MINUSMA ’ s “ robust ” posture is largely provided by the French Barkhane force . In fact , the French Barkhane force is addressed within MINUSMA ’ s mandate , but without placing the force under UN command . MINUSMA ’ s mandate does not permit MINUSMA to conduct joint operations with the French Barkhane force ; however , it does authorize Operation Barkhane ’ s support to MINUSMA while “ Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping , including consent of the parties , impartiality , and non-use of force , except in self-defense and defense of the mandate .” ( 2 )
“ OPERATION BARKHANE : Global Sub-Saharan Anti-Terrorist Mission Operation Barkhane , spanning five countries in the Sahel region of North Africa , started in the beginning of August 2014 after the completion of Operation SERVAL . With its main base in the Chadian capital N ' Djamena , it is actively present in Burkina Faso , Mali , Mauritania , Chad and Niger . … Through operations in the region of the three borders in coordination and alongside the Malian armed forces , operation Barkhane maintains the pressure on armed terrorist groups . In just over two months [ Feb-Mar 2018 ], some 60 terrorists have been put out of action . In addition , pick-ups and motorcycles , individual and collective armaments , as well as a large quantity of equipment necessary for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices were seized or destroyed . These operations are systematically accompanied by actions to help the local population .” ( 3 )
The arrangement between French Barkhane forces and MINUSMA , however , sometimes results in problematic situations . One example is MINUSMA ’ s mandate / action to support the redeployment of Mali ’ s defense and security forces . Mali ’ s defense and security forces cooperate on a regular basis with the French Barkhane force , particularly in efforts against terrorism . These cooperative activities between parties ( MINUSMA , Malian , and French ) give the perception that all three are working together against terrorism … which can cause HN groups to questions MINUSUMA ’ s impartiality and legitimacy . In a similar way , the disarmament , demobilization and reintegration ( DDR ) process supported by MINUSMA involves verification of participants ( some of whom may have terrorist affiliation ), which often relies on local information to aid verification ; however , locals may not be as forthcoming if they view MINUSMA as not being impartial . To complicate matters , in Mali , the associations between the armed signatory groups ( to the ceasefire ) and the armed terrorist groups are not clear and are topics of debate . The Bamako government does not always clearly differentiate between Tuareg rebels and jihadists , for instance , implying possible connections and / or similarities .
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