SOLLIMS Sampler Volume 9, Issue 2 | Page 26

Since the conclusion of this evaluation report , CAR remains volatile . The International Crisis Group reports that “ violence has flared almost everywhere in the provinces ” since the end of 2016 , driven by competition for resources by armed groups and exacerbated by continued inter-ethnic tensions between Christians and Muslims . The disarmament and reintegration processes endorsed by the Bangui Forum have yet to be fully implemented , the presidential elections at the end of 2015 / beginning of 2016 only provided a brief respite from continued fighting , an attempted peace agreement ceasefire brokered in Italy in June 2017 did not hold , and over 1.1 million people are displaced , the highest ever recorded in the CAR . However , the 18 October 2017 United Nations Report of the Secretary-General on CAR affirms that the situation in the capital city of Bangui “ remained relatively calm ,” ( p . 3 ); according to International Crisis Group , “ over the past two years significant progress has been made in Bangui in terms of security .” Although the rest of the country is still trapped in cycles of violence , the peace in Bangui may in part be thanks to the bolstered community capacity to manage conflict nonviolently , as supported by Mercy Corps and MINUSCA ’ s ongoing efforts for mediation in the community .
Recommendation .
1 . During complex crises in fragile contexts , support community mechanisms for the nonviolent resolution of conflicts . This can include training community leaders in conflict resolution , raising awareness of nonviolence through peer educators , or implementing joint socio-economic projects to build trust between opposing groups .
2 . Provide flexible funding for these circumstances ( such as USAID ’ s CCF ), which can more easily adapt to the changing needs on the ground . Dedicate global funding sources to conflict prevention and peacebuilding , especially for fragile states that may face a resurgence of violence .
3 . Continue to support the capacity of local non-governmental organizations , community leaders , and MINUSCA to promote community mediation and disseminate messages of peace in CAR . Expand this work beyond the capital city to regions across CAR which are still reeling from violence and displacement .
Implications .
If communities have the capacity and mechanisms for nonviolent conflict management , then they can absorb shocks more easily , and it is less likely that any small conflict or disagreement will automatically continue cycles of retaliatory violence . If people see leaders solving disagreements in a peaceful , nonviolent way , then they will see this as a possibility and may adapt it . If community members do not see this , then they might not be able to imagine nonviolent conflict resolution as a real possibility , and then they may be more likely to turn to violence to address grievances . If joint socio-economic projects are implemented that will benefit both opposing groups , this may show the broader community the benefits of cooperation and may lead to peaceful interaction between the opposing groups . If different groups work together on economic cooperation , then they may trust each other and see the broader mutual benefits . If funding is flexible for a complex crisis , then programs can more easily adapt , like Mercy Corps ' SVC did based on realities on the ground ; however , if donors and funding are not flexible , then programs are less likely to be effective in responding to needs in the community .
“ The positive , real-time responses of SVC program actors and structures to manage peace demonstrate that where commitments to and structures for non-violent dispute resolution exist , communities are more resilient to shocks ” ( Mercy Corps , p . 9 ). “ Ignoring grievances or violent tendencies during a humanitarian crisis , moreover , can contribute to worsening cycles of violence , fragility and poverty that keep countries like the CAR , South Sudan , Yemen , Afghanistan and Yemen mired in poverty and conflict ” ( Mercy Corps , p . 8 ).
Table of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI 25