The confusion over FET roles compounded confusion over how to properly evaluate the teams . It was difficult for measures of performance , effectiveness , or accountability to be established and implemented for these teams . FETs from 2010 to early 2012 in southern Afghanistan were unable to obtain good baseline information , and FET reports showed a lack of “ before and after ” scenarios . Furthermore , the standards by which some FETs evaluated themselves showed a lack of cultural and contextual understanding . The FET program in RC-S did not always take into consideration how Afghan women ’ s quality of life ( mobility , access to services ) had evolved over the past decades or what knowledge had already been accumulated from prior humanitarian and development initiatives . For example , Afghan women expressing happiness and / or the perceived popularity of the FET was used as an ad hoc measure of impact on the communities . However , according to the article by Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam on which this lesson is based , “ Evaluation of multiple aid programmes in Afghanistan has shown that Afghans will almost always say the programme implemented achieved its aims and was a success . […] Outbursts of emotion , blessings and prayers are very unreliable indicators of impact , and yet they consistently appear in FET reporting ” ( 2014 , p . 20 ).
This lack of appropriate metrics was exacerbated by the pervasive pressure the FETs were under to report everything as a success – known as “ success reporting .” Each commander is required to show results within the short timeframe of six months or one year of his or her deployment , and his or her subordinates may feel that same pressure to succeed . For U . S . servicewomen , this was heightened by the ongoing debate about women in combat . Due to the Combat Exclusion Policy which was not lifted until 2013 , U . S . servicewomen were not allowed to be directly assigned to ground combat units , but they could be “ attached ” to them , as some FETs were . Due to cultural resistance from some male military personnel of these female servicemembers being attached to ground combat units , many female servicemembers felt increased pressure to prove themselves and the women-centric FET program against the scrutiny of their male colleagues .
Throughout USMC and UK reporting from Helmand province in 2010-2012 , according to Azarbaijani-Moghaddam , former advisor to the UK military command in southern Afghanistan , every engagement is described with great detail , often listing single conversations or enthusiasm by local women as critical events . Furthermore , sweeping results are claimed for entire communities even if engagements only involved a few individuals . This “ success reporting ” by FETs led to misrepresentation of Afghans , mistaking grandstanding as sincere intent , raising expectations by creating hand-out mentality , and overall inaccurate reporting that went unverified by consultation with Afghans or subject matter experts .
“ Still struggling to be accepted and thought of as worthy in the military , [ female Soldiers in FETs ] tried to make an experimental concept based on erroneous assumptions succeed in a difficult and complex environment , at times with no interpreters , knowing that they would return to base empty-handed to face colleagues who were either cynical or had unrealistic expectations of results . The FET experiment was the sociological equivalent of sending troops out with malfunctioning weaponry ,” ( Azarbaijani-Moghaddam , 2014 , p . 2 ).
Recommendation .
Female Engagement Teams should incorporate appropriate evaluation frameworks to prevent against “ success reporting ,” which may lead to inaccurate or misleading reports that may have unintended negative ramifications both for the local community and for the commanders ’ decision-making . Future efforts should :
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