SOLLIMS Sampler Volume 8, Issue 1 - Page 8

and studying the directives of Supreme Headquarters” and “knew Munich better than we did our own home towns.” (CASE STUDIES ON FIELD OPERATIONS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNITS, Training Packet No. 7, The Provost Marshal General’s School, 1 April 1950.) It continued to track changing conditions in Munich and was prepared to execute its mission regardless of which maneuver headquarters was assigned the mission to liberate Bavaria. By doing so, F-213 gave LTG Patton, whose 3 rd Army was eventually given this mission, the ability to quickly establish military government within hours of the surrender of the city on 30 April 1945. Immediately upon entering the city, members of F-213 “went out to see how nearly the situation in Munich corresponded with the estimate made in the operational plan. They visited the gas plant, the water works, the sewage plant, the electric power plant, and made estimates of the labor and materials needed to restore them to operation. They interviewed Cardinal Faulhaber and a representative of the Lutheran Bishop of Bavaria. They questioned educators and welfare workers.” Within 48 hours of their arrival, “(f)ood, fuel and clothing stocks were surveyed and placed under guard. Banks were closed and the directors told to report back later. Radio and newspaper facilities were seized, while a series of broadcasts from sound trucks was instituted to disseminate reports of world events to the news-starved people.” (The Provost Marshal General’s School.) Forty-five years after the end of World War II, U.S. forces found themselves preparing for another operation to remove invading forces from a sovereign nation – Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait. While now a permanent part of Army structure, 96% of the civil affairs force was assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve and was not initially considered in U.S. Central Command plans for “restoring Kuwait’s legitimate government in place of a puppet regime,” as directed by President George H. W. Bush in National Security Directive 45 on 20 August 1990. U.S. government departments and agencies following the events in Kuwait became concerned about the potential post-conflict issues they would eventually face there and it soon became clear that “the scope of post-combat missions relating to the care of displaced civilians, restoration of order, and a return to normalcy—not only in Kuwait, but possibly in Saudi Arabia and Iraq— was likely to overwhelm the small, active duty Civil Affairs force assigned to the region.” (CASE STUDY NO. 4, COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES, The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning and Interagency Coordination, Dennis Barlow, 2010.) In October 1990, in response to a request to President George H. W. Bush from the Kuwaiti Government-in-Exile, the U.S. government agreed to provide restoration planning, advice, and post-conflict assistance to the Kuwait Emergency and Recovery Program. On 1 December 1990, fifty-seven specially selected Soldiers of the 352 nd Civil Affairs Command and the 354 th Civil Affairs Brigade – U.S. Army Reserve units that were mission-focused on the Central Table of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI Page 7 of 28