SOLLIMS Sampler Volume 10, Issue 1 - Page 9

for the PNP in conjunction with host nation authorities, while the MSG continued to provide “mentorship” and conduct joint patrols with the PNP. While the MSG worked in an advising/ mentoring capacity to help develop the PNP, the U.S. military’s Judicial Liaison Group also worked in the same way to help develop the host nation’s judiciary. … The creation of the Judicial Liaison Group (JLG) helped to advise and assist the Panamanians on legal and judicial matters. The JLG [consisting of U.S. Army South lawyers] was able to help organize and assist the new Panamanian government in setting up the beginnings of a judicial system. (Conley, p. 33) Closing Thought: “In retrospect, Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty were quite successful. But, that is not to say the plans for each were flawless or that they had been adequately coordinated during the planning process. Consider, for example, the mindset reflected in the terminology used to describe the operations. In discussions before, during, and after the invasion, Operation Just Cause was generally referred to as the conflict phase, and Operation Promote Liberty was referred to the post-conflict phase. These terms suggested sequential operations when, in fact, the two began almost simultaneously. The overlap had been anticipated, but few planners or troop units had prepared them- selves for its ramifications.” (Yates, p. 51) Recommendations: 1. Planning: Institute comprehensive, coordinated interagency planning for transitional public security (TPS) efforts with clear allocation of roles/responsibilities, joint prioritization of resources/capabilities, and common understanding of the operational environment, assumptions, and contingencies. Ensure that DoD and DoJ (i.e., U.S. Marshals Service) are linked in planning for clearing detainee warrants. 2. Command and Control: Develop a system of command relationships and trigger points for when the military command and participating law enforcement agencies [e.g., U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), etc.] shall assume “supported” and “supporting” roles throughout operations. 3. Training: Provide training for the General Purpose Forces on TPS tasks – particularly “establish civil security and public order” and “conduct interim detention.” 4. Organization: Ensure that the deploying force is sufficiently resourced with law enforce- ment personnel/units – both military and civilian. Under the overall direction of the U.S. Country Team, consider establishing specialized groups to help manage transitional public security efforts [along the lines of the U.S. Forces Liaison Group (USFLG) and Judicial Liaison Group (JLG).] In future Coalition stability operations, consider requesting the deploy- ment of para-military police units (e.g., French Gendarmerie, Italian Carabinieri, etc.). - “Law enforcement … represents a particular challenge during stability operations. Post-conflict situations are often chaotic; the presence of insurgents and armed criminals gangs, as well as the ready availability of small arms, can cause both foreign and indigenous police forces to be diverted to deal with these high-end threats, thereby limiting their effectiveness in dealing with basic crime prevention and law enforcement at a local level. Population control and protection are likely to be important Table of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI Page 8 of 36