SOLLIMS Sampler Volume 10, Issue 1 - Page 4

“QUICK LOOK” (Preview of the Lessons) Click on [Read More ...] to go to full lesson. A. The U.S. military played a key role in restoring civil security & public order and supporting detention operations (i.e., “transitional public security”) during Operation Just Cause (20 December 1989 to 11 January 1990) and the concurrent Operation Promote Liberty (which had the same start date, but continued on through September 1994) – successfully accomplished in spite of shortfalls in “whole of government” planning. [Read More ...] B. In Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (1994), combat arms leaders/units – without any civil security training and little to no Haitian cultural understanding – almost jeopardized the entire operation early on through certain missteps, including heavy-handed actions. In contrast, military police (MPs) – i.e., soldiers/units specifically trained for law enforcement and prepared to deal with the public – were able to effectively accomplish civil security/ public order tasks and showcased their value for such operations/ scenarios. Also, Special Forces (SF) personnel demonstrated keen cultural awareness and partnering skills – establishing security throughout rural areas. [Read More ...] C. Transitional Public Security was successfully accomplished by the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina because of four factors: (1) IFOR was largely perceived by the population groups as being legitimate (authorized to be present in the country); (2) IFOR was largely perceived by the population groups as being not only powerful, but overwhelmingly so; (3) IFOR’s leadership placed emphasis on understanding the culture and working with diverse groups of people/stakeholders; and, (4) IFOR worked with an international police force. [Read More ...] D. The U.S./Coalition (ISAF) failed to restore civil security and public order (“transitional public security”) in the aftermath of successful military operations in Afghanistan that ousted the Taliban from the central government in fall 2001. ISAF failed at the restora- tion of civil security and public order because of not working by, with, and through (BWT) the local power-holders and the local/traditional systems of law and order. Moreover, ISAF failed because there was no peace agreement reached among the power-holders (warlords) and factions (including the Taliban). [Read More ...] E. Establishing a safe and secure environment involves much more than initial policing actions. The reduction of violence in the given operating environment over time requires a range of other actions and appropriate resourcing. [Read More ...] F. The Combined Security Mechanism (CSM), a framework agreement set up in 2009 between the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Kurdish Peshmerga forces, and U.S. forces in Iraq, helped to prevent tensions along Arab-Kurdish lines in the governorates of Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Diyala. The main features of the CSM were combined patrols and check- points operated by the Iraqi Army, Kurdish Peshmerga troops, and U.S. forces (covering disputed boundaries/areas within the three governorates), as well as coordination centers that served to improve communication and trust between the two groups (Arabs and Kurds). [Read More ...] Table of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI Page 3 of 36