SOLLIMS Sampler Volume 10, Issue 1 - Page 31

4. If establishing a CSM-like framework/mechanism, it would be wise to contact the leaders involved in the CSM in Iraq – to learn from their experiences. Implications: If a multi-party security framework/mechanism (such as the tripartite CSM) is not estab- lished to ensure security coverage of disputed boundaries/areas, then incidents/sparks/ confrontations occurring in those areas could lead to greater outbreaks of conflict – adversely impacting/jeopardizing Stability operations. Comments: 1. Note on local police: The “CSM Guiding Principles” permitted autonomy for local police – specifying that local police within the CSAs could continue to undertake their normal duties without consulting with the CCC. 2. Note on U.S. support/resourcing: One concept for resourcing the CSM would be to establish a One-Star HQ for management (small staff, like a Division Tactical Operations Center) and provide a modified Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to help man 24-26 checkpoints (with counterparts), conduct combined patrols, provide logistical support, etc. Sources: This lesson is based on the following sources:      Notes from a senior U.S. Army officer “Managing Arab-Kurd Tensions in Northern Iraq After the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops,” by Larry Hanauer, Jeffrey Martini, and Omar Al-Shahery, RAND Corporation, 25 July 2011 “Section 3.6 – Iraq” in “Review of Political Missions 2011,” published by Center on International Cooperation (CIC)/New York University (NYU), 3 October 2011 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” DoD Report to Congress, March 2010 “Combined Security Mechanism Slides from Civilian Chamber of Commerce Briefing,” 14 December 2016 Civilians at CSM checkpoint in Ninewa. “Golden Lions” with children in Kirkuk Table of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI Page 30 of 36