SOLLIMS Sampler Volume 10, Issue 1 - Page 30

      managed, and equal or higher to that of their peers. Additionally, it was important for leaves to be carefully managed – predictable and supported. Present for duty strength of partner forces. CSM guidelines called for partner platoons that consisted of a minimum of 20 personnel who would run 24-hour operations and execute combined patrols at each checkpoint. Although the numbers started out strong at the checkpoints, after 30 days, partner units’ strength diminished to roughly squad-size, while the U.S. maintained full-strength platoons. Talent and training for partner manning of the Combined Coordination Centers. Initially, the partners provided adequate manning, but this quickly tapered off through high personnel turnover, particularly among the Iraqis. Every day was “discovery learning” for some of the new personnel, as opposed to routine operations – which was not a good situation for the CCC regarding handling information, sharing information, and responding to crises. “Direct line to Baghdad” and “Direct line to Erbil” from the Combined Coordination Center. It was important for U.S. leadership in the CCC to be aware that person- nel manning the CCC might have external communications unrelated to the CSM. Partner communications from the Combined Coordination Centers to the check- points. Based on reliability of functioning of those communications, communica- tions from U.S. to U.S. liaison may be needed/better option. “Local” forces manning the checkpoints. In western Diyala Province, local Iraqi Army and local Kurds manned the checkpoints. Some of these individuals had previously been manning standoff checkpoints in same areas and had bones to pick with each other. Although U.S. forces managed this situation, it could have been avoided early on by bringing in Iraqi and Kurdish forces from another location, vice “local” personnel. Interpreters. The CSM had high interpreter/translator requirements. Often had to shuffle these personnel and reprioritize their work to have coverage in the right places. As far as an overall assessment of the CSM, in most locations along the fault lines, the “Golden Lions” were viewed by the local populace as the most trusted force. Most people believed that they would get a fair shake from the “Golden Lions” at checkpoints and whenever/wherever they were seen out on patrol. Additionally, the “Golden Lions” proved to be a tremendous asset during the Iraqi national elections of 2010 for confidence-building and area security around polling sites, particularly in Mosul and Kirkuk. Recommendations: 1. When U.S. forces are conducting a Stability mission, and the Area of Operations includes territory in which two (or more) local groups/factions have disputed boundaries, then the U.S. should consider establishment of a security framework/mechanism like the CSM. 2. If establishing a CSM-like framework/mechanism, then ensure that the recognized leaders of the local groups/factions establish a set of rules for the forces involved. 3. If establishing a CSM-like framework/mechanism, pay heed to the key issues / potential pitfalls identified in this lesson. Table of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI Page 29 of 36