U.S. forces were represented at all levels of the CSM. An American lieutenant colonel
oversaw each governorate’s CCC. An American colonel served as the U.S. representative
on the Senior Working Group. U.S. troops participated in combined patrols and in 22
combined checkpoints – 11 in Ninewa, 6 in Kirkuk, and 5 in Diyala governorates. Addition-
ally, the U.S. military provided extensive training for the ISF and Kurdish Peshmerga forces
of the CSM.
Checkpoint Location Selection:
U.S. leadership that established these checkpoints took lessons/experiences from
Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia (1995-1996), where checkpoints were
established along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) to separate the former
warring factions.
U.S. leaders talked to local Iraqi force and Peshmerga force commanders
individually and then together ... and then selected locations along the Arab-Kurd
fault line (generally the final line of advance of the Peshmerga in 2003 with some
nuanced exceptions in cities and towns) – i.e., specific points along the line that
were the most sensitive/controversial/scenes of fights/high casualties in 2003, as
well as current “flashpoints” between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds.
Some locations – because they were so sensitive – already had existing “stand-
off” checkpoints to control (deny) movement between Arab and Kurd sides of the
lines. The CSM checkpoints replaced those existing points.
Almost every CSM checkpoint selected (but not all) was astride a major roadway
to allow emplacement of a traffic control point (TCP) as part of the checkpoint.
Those not astride a major roadway were selected, however, because they were
close enough to a main roadway to facilitate quick establishment of a “snap”
checkpoint on the roadway if desired.
Urban checkpoints were obviously more numerous than rural checkpoints. Most
urban checkpoints were on the edge of town on a key approach.
Where feasible (but this was rare), checkpoints were placed on defensible terrain.
At the very least, terrain was selected where a Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ)
could be contiguous or at least very close to the checkpoint for Medical Evacua-
tion (MEDEVAC) and resupply.
Combined Coordination Centers: Combined Coordination Center locations were agreed
upon by Iraqi, Kurdish Peshmerga, and U.S. military leaders – most often placed at an
existing base roughly center of sector of the checkpoints for which it was responsible.
Checkpoint Construction:
Careful analysis was done by U.S. Army Combat Engineers to generate the bill of
materials (BOM) for each checkpoint and the Combined Coordination Centers.
U.S. Army Engineers built them, with minor help from locals on earth-moving and
concrete purchase.
Essentially, most checkpoints were a lived-in company defensive position with a
blast-protected TCP that had both vehicle and individual search areas all rolled
into one – with heavy use of HESCO, T-walls, wire, and wood.
On every checkpoint there was a sleeping area (some had a combined sleeping
area, but most had separate sleeping areas for each force), a combined chow
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