SOLLIMS Sampler Volume 10, Issue 1 - Page 17

Both IFOR and the IPTF continuously engaged with the local police: Coordination with the local police was carried out as follows: informing the sides as to their compliance with the Dayton Accords; clarifying and compelling compliance with the essential points of the Accords, as well as conveying information from one side to the other based on their mutual consent; resolving civilian conflicts jointly with the police of the sides as an intermediary; and monitoring fulfillment of the Accords, particularly the requirements placed on the police formations of the sides. In addition, coordination was accomplished for the following: jointly provided security for mass events in the zone of separation (rallies, Serbian-Moslem meetings, exchange of detainees, etc.); settling various types of incidents that arose between the Serbs, Moslems and military service personnel during the course of daily life (traffic accidents, petty theft, damage to crops, cutting down trees, etc.); helping the police support the negotiation process; and, con- ducting joint investigation of the facts involved in various types of extraordinary events (the blowing up of bridges, injuries caused by mines, illegal deals between brigade personnel and the local population, attempts by the local population to penetrate to outposts, etc.). (FMSO report, p. 38) Besides possessing legitimacy, overwhelming force, and international police, the overall Transitional Public Security effort was also successful because IFOR’s leadership placed emphasis on understanding culture and working with diverse groups of people/stake- holders. Knowing that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be much different than previous deployments of NATO personnel, General Crouch (U.S. Army Europe Commander and IFOR Commander) conversed with former British commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (which had previously operated in Bosnia-Herzegovina) to try to gain insights into the problems senior leaders would confront once on the ground. Because of those insights and the challenges foreseen, General Crouch called for development and implementation of a whole new training program that brought experts on negotiation & conflict resolution from the U.S. Army War College over to Europe. They provided 1st Armored Division’s senior leadership with specific training on historical, ethnic, political, and cultural awareness issues in Bosnia; conflict resolution and negotiation techniques; how to use language translators; how to conduct joint military commissions; how to deal with hostile and friendly media; and, how to work with civilians in the inter- national community. In addition, the new training program included a self-study packet of literature on Bosnia and the Balkans, covering various cultural, political, and military subjects. Once the 1st Armored Division was on the ground in Bosnia, its members provided feedback to General Crouch. Training was continuously adjusted based upon new, first-hand information from personnel in-country. Major General Byrnes, 1st Cavalry Division’s Commanding General, built upon General Crouch’s training program – adding visits to the Department of State; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the U.S. Army’s Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM); the Plans Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-5); the Office of the High Representative (OHR); the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the International Police Task Force (IPTF); and, the International Court Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). At the senior leader level, putting training into practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina required patience and thoughtfulness – and General Crouch set the example: Table of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI Page 16 of 36