Both IFOR and the IPTF continuously engaged with the local police:
Coordination with the local police was carried out as follows: informing the sides as
to their compliance with the Dayton Accords; clarifying and compelling compliance with
the essential points of the Accords, as well as conveying information from one side to the
other based on their mutual consent; resolving civilian conflicts jointly with the police of
the sides as an intermediary; and monitoring fulfillment of the Accords, particularly the
requirements placed on the police formations of the sides. In addition, coordination was
accomplished for the following: jointly provided security for mass events in the zone of
separation (rallies, Serbian-Moslem meetings, exchange of detainees, etc.); settling
various types of incidents that arose between the Serbs, Moslems and military service
personnel during the course of daily life (traffic accidents, petty theft, damage to crops,
cutting down trees, etc.); helping the police support the negotiation process; and, con-
ducting joint investigation of the facts involved in various types of extraordinary events
(the blowing up of bridges, injuries caused by mines, illegal deals between brigade
personnel and the local population, attempts by the local population to penetrate to
outposts, etc.). (FMSO report, p. 38)
Besides possessing legitimacy, overwhelming force, and international police, the overall
Transitional Public Security effort was also successful because IFOR’s leadership placed
emphasis on understanding culture and working with diverse groups of people/stake-
holders. Knowing that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be much different than previous
deployments of NATO personnel, General Crouch (U.S. Army Europe Commander and
IFOR Commander) conversed with former British commander of the United Nations
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (which had previously operated in Bosnia-Herzegovina)
to try to gain insights into the problems senior leaders would confront once on the ground.
Because of those insights and the challenges foreseen, General Crouch called for
development and implementation of a whole new training program that brought experts
on negotiation & conflict resolution from the U.S. Army War College over to Europe. They
provided 1st Armored Division’s senior leadership with specific training on historical, ethnic,
political, and cultural awareness issues in Bosnia; conflict resolution and negotiation
techniques; how to use language translators; how to conduct joint military commissions;
how to deal with hostile and friendly media; and, how to work with civilians in the inter-
national community. In addition, the new training program included a self-study packet of
literature on Bosnia and the Balkans, covering various cultural, political, and military
subjects. Once the 1st Armored Division was on the ground in Bosnia, its members
provided feedback to General Crouch. Training was continuously adjusted based upon
new, first-hand information from personnel in-country.
Major General Byrnes, 1st Cavalry Division’s Commanding General, built upon General
Crouch’s training program – adding visits to the Department of State; the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the U.S. Army’s Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM);
the Plans Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-5); the Office of the High Representative (OHR);
the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); the International Police
Task Force (IPTF); and, the International Court Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
At the senior leader level, putting training into practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina required
patience and thoughtfulness – and General Crouch set the example:
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