Transitional Public Security – the Case of the Implementation Force
[Bosnia-Herzegovina] (Lesson #2663)
Observation:
Transitional Public Security was successfully accomplished by the Implementation Force
(IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina because of four factors: (1) IFOR was largely perceived by
the population groups as being legitimate (authorized to be present in the country); (2) IFOR
was largely perceived by the population groups as being not only powerful, but overwhelm-
ingly so; (3) IFOR’s leadership placed emphasis on understanding the culture and working
with diverse groups of people/stakeholders; and, (4) IFOR worked with an international
police force.
Discussion.
Although not termed “Transitional Public Security” in 1995-1996, such work (restoring
civil security, protecting the civilian population, and maintaining public order) was indeed
performed by IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the signing of the Dayton Accords. Not
only did IFOR perform such work, IFOR accomplished this work with great success.
The primary factors for IFOR’s success in Bosnia-Herzegovina were twofold: (1) the
warring sides had agreed to the Dayton Peace Accords, which gave legitimacy to IFOR,
and (2) the force that deployed into Bosnia-Herzegovina left no doubt among the former
warring factions that it possessed overwhelming combat superiority.
The majority of the peacekeeping action participants judge the deployment of IFOR
to have been one of the most important and successful phases of the operation. The
attention with which the IFOR command approached the deployment is confirmed in
the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR’s) instructions to his staff.
These instructions were given during the planning of the operation. “By the organized
way in which we will begin the deployment, the warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina
will see that they are confronting totally new approaches from the world community …
that we are fully determined to carry out the task assigned to us – to force them to
comply with the principles of the peace accords.” (FMSO report, pp. 32-33)
IFOR was not simply a NATO force. Notably, it included a Russian contingent. Overall,
military contingents from 36 countries (15 NATO countries and 21 non-NATO countries)
contributed to IFOR. The total number of ground forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina was
approximately 84,000. Of those, some 71,000 personnel were from NATO countries and
12,000 from non-NATO countries. The main component of the IFOR ground forces was
NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) – composed of three multi-national divisions.
Assets included: 475 tanks, 1,367 artillery pieces/rocket systems/ mortars, 1,654 armored
combat vehicles, 66 air defense missile systems, and 180 attack helicopters.
The Dayton Accords mapped out an Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) with a Zone of
Separation (ZOS) (roughly 2 km on both sides of the IEBL) to keep the former warring
factions apart. IFOR’s three multinational divisions (French-led division, British-led division,
and U.S.-led division having a Russian brigade and a Nordic-Polish brigade) – deployed in
December 1995. They initially established strongpoints within the ZOS, continuously
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