That said, U.S combat arms leaders/units were not properly prepared to carry out their
mission (restore and preserve civil order; create a secure environment), as evidenced by the
following early incidents:
(1) The day after the mission began, on September 20, a tragic incident illustrated
the initial illogic of the situation. Near the harbor, astonished and frustrated American
troops stood by passively while members of the FAd’H lunged into a peaceful crowd
that had gathered to celebrate and observe the extraordinary events unfolding in the
capital. The police swiftly attacked the Haitian civilians and brutally beat one man to
death. Witnessed by television crews and an international audience, the affair created a
public relations crisis. In point of fact, similar incidents had already occurred outside the
view of the media. …The painful result was a loss of prestige and legitimacy among the
U.S. and the Multinational Force (MNF), not to mention their initial failure to establish
order in Port-au-Prince.” (Kretchik et al, pp. 97-98)
(2) The [U.S.] Marines began aggressive foot patrols upon arrival, thereby establish-
ing a high-visibility presence. On September 24, as one such patrol led by a Marine
lieutenant approached the Cap Haitien police station, FAd’H members outside began
to make what the lieutenant perceived to be threatening gestures, including one man
reaching for a weapon. The Marines opened fire (spraying the building with 1,000 rounds),
killing ten of the FAd’H in a brief fight; no Marines were hit. …Major General David Meade
[Commander, 10th Mountain Division] noted, news of the episode inevitably strained
working relations with the FAd’H. …Word of the firefight spread like wildfire, first through-
out Cap Haitien and then the entire country. The Haitian people in the main responded…
On the following day, September 25, mobs in Cap Haitien looted four police stations. In a
related occurrence, rioting and pillage broke out at a warehouse in the city. …Three days
later, on the 29th, [an individual] hurled a grenade into a crowd at a ceremony marking the
reinstallation of popular Port-au-Prince mayor, Evans Paul. To calm the capital, maneuver
elements of JTF 190 poured into the city in force. (Kretchik, pp. 98-99)
In contrast to combat arms units, U.S. Army MPs – trained for law enforcement and prepared
to deal with the public – performed civil security/public order tasks with great skill and success.
U.S. Military Police proved invaluable in many street situations in Port-au-Prince. More
accustomed by training than infantrymen to carrying out arrests and other missions at the
low end of the violence continuum, MPs demonstrated the ability to seize suspects, while
exercising restraint and preventing situations that might have degenerated into exchanges
of gunfire. In one instance, when a group of U.S. infantrymen was in pursuit of a notorious
and armed fugitive, MPs on the scene calmly approached the suspect, instructed him to
leave his vehicle and turn over his weapons, and took him into custody without creating
any disturbance. The MPs exercised extraordinary latitude in the arrest and detention of
suspects, who were taken to a holding facility upon apprehension. MPs at the facility had
not only to maintain humane conditions but were prepared to receive attorneys, family
members, and even diplomats who came to visit detainees. … Throughout Port-au-Prince,
MPs began to take shifts at Haitian police stations, both to provide supervision and to set
a professional example. (Kretchik, p. 104)
Thanks in large part to the work of U.S. Army MPs in urban areas, the actions of U.S. Army
Special Forces operating in rural areas (discussed below), and the subsequent efforts of the
25th Infantry Division (which relieved the 10th Mountain Division in January 1995), Haitians
Table of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI
Page 11 of 36