SOLLIMS Sampler Special Edition, May 2017 - Page 8

the previous night – and was far more one sided. Dinka fighters along with personnel “in SPLA uniforms” then largely had free reign across much of the camp for at least several hours, firing on Nuer and Shilluk civilians and burning their homes. By 2 p.m., large sections of the camp were reduced to ashes. 2,326 structures were destroyed by fire (around 35% of existing shelters in the POC), the IOM and IMC humanitarian clinics inside the camp were destroyed, three schools were destroyed, and latrines and water storage infrastructure were damaged. UNMISS forces finally intervened at approximately 3:45 p.m. The fighting ended at 4 p.m. The violence at Malakal POC site resulted in at least 144 civilian casualties (CIVCAS), including at least 25 deaths. UNMISS’ lack of action / leadership failure prior to 16 February 2016: - On 8 February, the UN Protection Cluster went to UNMISS civilian leadership to express their concerns about escalating violence within the Malakal POC site, and to ask that a risk mitigation plan be developed. UNMISS leadership in Malakal did not take action on this. - One week before the 16 February incident, a humanitarian agency became aware that part of the fence in Sector 2 of Malakal POC had been cut. It passed this information to UNMISS leadership. However, nothing was done to fix the fence deficiency. - A humanitarian agency recognized the scale of the weapons-smuggling problem at Malakal POC and reported this to UNMISS leadership. UNMISS leadership failed to take action. - A humanitarian agency informed UNMISS leadership that Malakal POC site was getting very tense days before the 16 February clashes. This report was disregarded. - Gate security at Malakal POC was being handled by contractors. UNMISS’s Department of Safety and Security (DSS) had contracted Warrior Security, a South Sudanese company, for gate security. One could ask, “Why weren’t UNMISS personnel, particularly police personnel, handling gate security?” UNMISS’ lack of action / leadership failure on 17 and 18 February: - In the late morning of 17 February, several Nuer and Shilluk leaders met with UNMISS leadership to express their concerns about guns within the Dinka section of the camp and about the two men who attempted to enter Juliet Gate with rifle magazines the previous day, aided by other men “in SPLA uniforms.” UNMISS leadership failed to act on these concerns. Table of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI Page 7 of 36