SOLLIMS Sampler Special Edition, May 2017 | Page 29

f. TOPIC. Establishing Civ-Mil Unified Action in a Deployed
Environment (Lesson #1564)
Observation.
Military leaders, Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational (JIIM)
partners, as well as their staffs and subordinate leaders, must fully understand
the roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign plans, constraints, limitations,
resources, caveats, timelines and priorities of each contributing organization, in
order to fully establish and exploit development unified action. This seemingly
easy task is only accomplished through frequent and open dialogue across each
contributing organization, and through frequent collaboration. These efforts nest
the collective efforts of the developmental team, while simultaneously looking for
opportunities to maximize the collective effects of the USG, Multinational partners
and NGOs.
Discussion.
During my 2nd deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) from
2007 to 2008, my brigade was privileged to have the support of a Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT); however, during this extended 15-month deploy-
ment, our brigade and the PRT didn't establish unified action or maximize our
collective potential for the entire duration of the deployment. Quite frankly, the
results of this shortcoming were that we wasted valuable time and resources
trying to comprehend each other’s roles, functions, goals, objectives, campaign
plans, constraints, limitations, resources, caveats, timelines and operational
priorities, when we could have been effortlessly and efficiently providing
assistance to the Iraqis and the Government of Iraq (GoI).
This friction began during our relief in place (RIP) as we arrived into our new area
of operations (AO) and manifested for the next 6-8 months. As OIF progressed
from a conventional military operation focused on combined arms maneuver and
then transitioned into a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation, the U.S. Army
established a COIN Academy in Taji, Iraq in order to train and enlighten leaders
on COIN operations as they arrived in theatre. The training was both rewarding
and worthwhile; however, it didn't possess a single class or block of instruction
on development and more importantly, PRTs. Additionally, although the leader-
ship from the battalion that we were replacing made an effort to meet us at Taji
prior to our final movement to our new AO, neither its parent brigade nor the
region's PRT made an effort to send representatives.
As our brigade and battalions began arriving in the AO, the focus was clearly
on maintaining security, transferring responsibilities, and handing over projects
and TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures), while assisting our newly arrived
units with understanding the VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous)
environment we were about to inherit. Again, at the battalion level, we weren't
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