SOLLIMS Sampler Special Edition, May 2017 | Page 22

USNS Comfort , equipped with surgical operating teams and orthopedic surgeons , arrived and began conducting round-the-clock medical support .
Because of the rapid deployment of the DoD Global Response Force , JTF-Haiti helped avert a major food and water crisis . Although more than 230,000 people died from the earthquake , the abundant and superior medical assistance provided by the U . S . military and the international community saved thousands of lives .
From the outset , JTF-Haiti planners and leaders worked alongside counterparts from the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti ( MINUSTAH ), USAID , and non-governmental organizations ( NGOs ). Together they developed plans for protecting internally displaced persons ( IDPs ) in makeshift camp – who were at great risk of further disaster due to the impending hurricane season and potential flooding . In February and early March , JTF-Haiti elements conducted comprehensive infrastructure assessments and then executed engineering projects – with the UN and NGOs – to mitigate the risk and reduce the number of people requiring relocation . Then , from mid-March through mid-May , JTF-Haiti supported the Haitian government , UN , USAID , and NGO partners by relocating IDPs from sites still at risk to transitional resettlement sites .
JTF-Haiti ' s Maritime Component Command , comprised of the 22nd and 24th Marine Expeditionary Units , conducted relief missions outside Port-au-Prince , to the west and to the north . Using the flexibility inherent in amphibious forces , these units brought relief to thousands of Haitians in the outlying regions .
Although the deployment of U . S . military forces and U . S . resources was quick and effective , it was not always efficient . The most significant challenge to the U . S . military – and to the international community – was logistics . Three specific areas presented major challenges to JTF-Haiti ' s logistical operations ( to those of the international players ):
“ Incomplete situational awareness ” at the outset made it difficult to determine requirements and priorities for providing relief and delivering supplies .
The “ lack of a unified and integrated logistics command and control structure ” led to gaps in reception , staging , and movement of forces , equipment , and supplies into Haiti . Logistics staffs were not always aware of many non-military activities and cargos .
The “ initial reliance on the one single airport ” ( Toussaint Louverture International Airport ) for throughput , created the need to validate and prioritize all flights ( including international flights ) to ensure that only the most critical cargo landed .
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