SOLLIMS Sampler Special Edition, May 2017 - Page 10

- UNMISS leadership in Juba was slow to address the violence – with the Crisis Management Team meeting for the first time around 3 p.m. on 18 February. One could ask, “Why didn’t UNMISS leadership call a Crisis Management Team meeting in the early morning of 18 February?” - UNMISS finally moved forces inside Sector 2 at around 3:45 p.m. They drove the Dinka fighters and men “in SPLA uniforms” off the camp within 15 minutes. Around 4 p.m., the situation calmed. Why didn’t UNMISS intervene earlier inside Sector 2? Impact: “The most recent assault on the Malakal POC site in February 2016 as well as on Bentiu POC and Bor POC in Jonglei in April 2014 called into question not only the ability of UNMISS to fulfill its protection mandate beyond its own gates, but also within them. The attacks eroded respect for UN peacekeeping and the integrity of the mission’s mandate, and have led to a loss of trust into the mission’s capabilities on part of the IDPs on the site despite the formulation of new contingency plans. Questions have been asked whether the attacks could have been prevented through conflict mediation, better camp management, or other interventions by civilian and police personnel as well as effective protection from external intrusions by UN force.” (Source: Hannah Dönges article) This Malakal POC catastrophe is a sad case of UN peacekeeping senior leadership failure. It should be noted that the UN Security Council had promul- gated the importance of senior leadership two years prior to this Malakal POC incident. On 12 February 2014, the Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/3). The statement condemned impediments to the fulfilment of the mandates of UN peace operations, such as attacks on mission personnel and bureaucratic obstacles, and called on the Council to consider the use of “targeted and graduated measures” against those violating international humanitarian and human rights law. Moreover, the 12 February presidential statement “reaffirmed the need for peacekeeping operations to ensure that they implement their protection of civilians’ mandates and stressed the role of senior mission leadership in this regard.” In Feb 2016, UNMISS senior leadership abandoned its role in this regard. Recommendations. 1. UN HQ needs to do a better job of selecting senior leaders (civilians) of peacekeeping Missions. UN HQ should consider instituting crisis response testing to screen candidates for Mission leadership positions. If candidates fail to respond appropriately to crises posed in tests, they should not be selected. Table of Contents | Quick Look | Contact PKSOI Page 9 of 36