symbolic universe and world order that they represent are accepted in their totality.
Moreover, since the public can no longer distinguish between signs of evil and real
malevolence, “There is no longer any metaphysical presence of evil nowadays […] Our
evil is faceless and imageless. It is present everywhere in homeopathic doses, in the
abstract patterns of technology, but it no longer has any mythic presence” (The
Intelligence of Evil 173). In a realm of floating signifiers where signs have now
themselves vanished, Motss exploits the fact that people can no longer tell the
difference between true morality and its representational caricatures. By saturating the
populace with appealing simulacra that supposedly allow them to see what evil is in
real-time, Brean and Motts narrate a heartwarming story of absolute good that always
conquers evil in the end. As Baudrillard reveals in The Intelligence of Evil,
It is, in fact, no longer exactly a struggle between good and evil. It’s a
question of transparency. Good is transparent: you can see through it […[
It is only through the distorted, disseminated figures of evil that one can
reconstitute, in perspective the figure of good. It is only through the
dispersed and falsely symmetrical figures of good that one can
reconstitute the paradoxical figure of evil (142).
By giving the false impression that viewers can see everything right in front of their
eyes, Motss ensures that virtual transparency facilitates complete blindness in terms of
the morality principle itself.
Although the notion of malevolence is in reality a multifaceted abstraction where
the lines between right and wrong are often tenuous at best, signs of war impose one
pre-packaged interpretation. Motss’s viewers know that evil exists because they see it
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