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Of particular importance in Herodotus’ account of the political
process are advisors, especially when they issue warnings.^’ Woodward
focuses on the contributions of advisors as well. Among the most
important ones are Cheney, Rumsfeld, Prince Bandar (Saudi ambassador
to the U.S.), Powell, Rice, Tenet and others. Woodward reports decisions
which precede the Iraq-war to identify certain patterns underlying the
decision making processes. Woodward analyzes Tenet's advisory
position. By July 2001 the CIA director had information concerning a
future attack of bin Laden. He tried to convey his intelligence to Rice,
but: “Rice had seemed focused on other administration priorities .. . She
was in a different place” (51). And about Bush, Woodward adds in this
matter: “Bush had said he didn't want to swat at flies” (51). The difficulty
of talking openly with the decision-maker is also described by
Herodotus. Christopher Pelling for example writes: “Croesus is a man of
untrammelled power. No one, especially no wise person, will tell a man
like this that he is likely to behave badly, and to bring himself as well as
others down.”^’ Woodward mentions a meeting in which the CIA tried to
warn about Iraq’s exercise of democracy. “After one CIA briefer
presented another warning. Bush chimed in, Ts this Baghdad Bob?’
referring to Saddam's propagandist. It was a stunning insult” (382).
In another example of the use of contributions of advisors in the
decision making process in order to detect and discern reasons of
unsuccessful decision making. Woodward refers to the decision of
Clinton to go to war about Kosovo. Admiral Vem Clark, who attended
the White House meetings in 1999 when Clinton decided to deal with
Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing, told Cheney: “Make sure you have people
around that will tell the president exactly what the facts are and not like
we did in Kosovo” (60). And Woodward continues: “Whether it was a
miscalculation or simply sugar coating. President Clinton’s advisers first
told him that Milosevic would fold if he were threatened. When he didn’t
fold, Clinton was told bombing would do the trick” (61). Clark
remembers how a “deep optimism” led to a 72 hour strike plan, but he is
very critical that there was nothing planned to follow it. Clark obviously
had the right idea of the position as first adviser to the president
(chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff). However, he did not get this job.
Clark and Rumsfeld disagreed because under the law, the chairman
“would have to give independent military advice to the president” (69)
The selection of another adviser had consequences: “The selection meant
that when it came to the hardest of decisions there would be no one in the
uniformed military positioned and supported by law to provide
alternative advice to the president and stand up to Rumsfeld” (70).