PKSOI Lessons Learned Report January 2019 | Page 4

2. SSR LESSONS
“Haste Makes Waste” – Security Sector Reform in Timor Leste
(Lesson #2697)
Observation:
Two international missions – UNTAET and UNMIT, as well as their United Nations Police
(UNPOL) component – fared poorly in their efforts to reform the security sector of Timor
Leste in the 2000-2008 timeframe. UNTAET focused its security sector reform (SSR) efforts
on training and equipping the local police, but: neglected the work of institutional reform;
failed to include key societal groups; failed to connect disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration (DDR) to SSR; failed to give due diligence to vetting of recruits; rushed into
security training programs without sufficient expertise or standards; and, gave little-to-no
attention to local political influences and illicit/disruptive practices. Ultimately, the security
sector collapsed in April 2006, with clashes occurring between military and police. UNMIT
deployed several months later, repeated several mistakes made by UNTAET, and fared no
better.
Discussion:
From the outset, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
rushed into security sector reform actions without a thoughtful strategy, after inheriting
police reform efforts from the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET). “The man-
dates to conduct SSR were initially separated between UNTAET and INTERFET, where
UNTAET focused on governance and oversight matters, while INTERFET attended to
providing interim security and creating the Timor-Leste Police Service (PNTL) ... In 2000,
UNTAET took control over INTERFET.” (Armstrong, p. 4)
In 2000, UNTAET adopted a plan proposed by King’s College to establish a defense force:
the Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (F-FDTL). However, “UNTAET delegated
the [recruitment] process completely to the former commander of Forças Armadas da
Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste, (FALINTIL), Taur Matan Ruak, and his staff. The
recruitment process drew heavy public criticism from political observers for disregarding
important steps of DDR, such as a thorough screening of recruits for their past crimes and
lack of reliability and loyalty to the constitution. Eventually, the recruitment process was
biased toward men from the eastern provinces of Timor-Leste” (Kocak, p. 352). In fact,
women who had served in the FALINTIL and other resistance groups were excluded from
the DDR process, despite their crucial role during the independence struggle.
While Ruak filled the F-FDTL primarily with former FALINTIL personnel, the UN – in stark
contrast – built up the ranks of the PNTL with a high proportion of former Kepolisian Negara
Republik Indonesia (POLRI) members. The POLRI had been the national police force
during the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste. By and large, the Timorese population
was displeased with seeing former POLRI members filling the ranks of the PNTL. POLRI’s
history was one of collaboration with the former occupiers, including use of repressive
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