PKSOI Lessons Learned Report January 2019 | Page 18

was allocated for reintegration efforts in the DRC’s military (FARDC) – causing limitations/
difficulties for that organization to incorporate former combatants.
3) An over-emphasis on disarmament.
The DDR programs focused heavily on the disarmament piece, to the detriment of
reintegration. Estimated numbers of personnel who disarmed were: 402 in the DDR-RR
program, 198,820 in the two national programs, and several thousand in the Ituri program.
In the latter program, some 6,200 weapons were collected; however, 70% were old and
unusable – indicating that many ex-combatants were not actually giving up their good/
functioning weapons. For most fighters who turned in their weapons, however, alternative
lifestyles/employment opportunities were not provided. DDR program managers failed to
emphasize the reintegration phase or properly resource it. Miniscule funding allocated for
vocational training, education, employment assistance, etc. quickly ran out.
4) The failure of the DRC to enact meaningful SSR.
The DRC’s government failed to take action to reform its security forces (military,
police), professionalize them, or deploy them in sufficient numbers to critical/volatile areas
such as Ituri. The absence of professional/ proficient security forces across the eastern
region translated to a huge security vacuum – soon filled by militia groups and criminal
gangs, with many new members joining their ranks for want of security, food, work, etc.
Also, numerous community leaders/chiefs in that region proceeded to organize their own
local militia groups for protection/security.
5) The DRC’s troubled relationships with neighboring countries, particularly Rwanda.
Rwandan militants/deserters proved to be problematic – with some helping the
Congolese Tutsis organize the notorious M23 rebel group – fighting for the Tutsi population
in North Kivu against Hutu militias. The M23, Hutu militias/nationalists, Rwandan fighters
living in the DRC, and external support from Rwanda perpetuated the violence/conflict
throughout the Kivu region for several years, with the UN ultimately deploying a Force
Intervention Brigade and authorizing offensive operations to counter/neutralize the M23.
However, international and regional bodies did not endeavor to fix the problematic relations
between the DRC and its neighbors, nor create effective mechanisms for removing foreign
fighters from the DRC.
Bottom Lines:
…The DDR programs in the DRC demonstrate that … demobilizing armed combatants
requires a transnational or even regional approach in order to stabilize a country and end
the fighting. (Hakimu & Gregg, p. 35)
…Overall, the DDR programs in the DRC did not place enough emphasis on
long-term efforts during the “reintegration” phase. … Successful reintegration requires
the parties to address a multitude of problems that go beyond illegally armed individuals,
including security sector reform, good job opportunities for ex-combatants, and mechanisms
for reconciliation and rebuilding trust within the communities that receive ex-combatants.
(Hakimu & Gregg, pp. 29-30)
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