WG Tasks: COL Morgan O’Rourke and the newly formed
Army FHA Team within PKSOI sponsored WG 3. The WG
had two primary tasks. First, the WG conducted an informal
DOTMLPF-P gap analysis by reviewing known gaps, and
allowing the community of interest to provide observations on
the Army’s ability to deliver unique capabilities and capacities
in support of USG efforts to stabilize fragile states in a complex
disaster. Second, the group aimed to review the Joint Staff,
J6/7 efforts to enhance CIV-MIL Information Sharing (CMIS)
through standardization within the Mission Partner Environ-
ment and Federated Mission Network. The WG conducted
this assessment simultaneously with an assessment of the CMIS
within the VIKING 18 exercise.
Desired Outcomes: The desired outcomes were to refine the
Army FHA Capability Development (CD) Program Objectives
and Milestones (POAM) for FY18-19, and to inform the final-
ization of CMIS efforts between May and Oct.
Representation: The working group had representation from
OSD-Policy, Joint Staff, all four Services, interagency partners,
and multiple senior service colleges. Rather than using a previ-
ous FHA scenario, the WG chose to leverage the PKSOI North
Korean Post-conflict Case Study written by PKSOI’s DoS Advi-
sor Tammy Fitzgerald to provide the context for the discussion.
This case study allowed the working group to discuss some of
the most challenging conditions in terms of organizational com-
plexity, environmental factors, and scope of requirements.
Discussion Summary: The discussion highlighted the lack
of a pre-existing NGO foothold within North Korea, which
would challenge typical methods of delivering USG support
to provide humanitarian assistance. The typical UN cluster
system would take far longer than normal to establish itself
given the limited access prior to an event. The level of destruc-
tion to infrastructure would not only place the already tenuous
distribution of essential services at risk, but would significantly
slow the re-establishment of basic social well-being in a system
that lacks much resiliency. The array of stakeholders, including
Republic of Korea (ROK), China, and Russia also highlighted
the potential challenges to sharing information and coordinat-
ing relief efforts. The expectation was that the remnants of the
8
WG 3 had two primary tasks. First, the WG conducted an
informal DOTMLPF-P gap analysis by reviewing known gaps,
and allowing the community of interest to provide observations
on the Army’s ability to deliver unique capabilities and capacities
in support of USG efforts to stabilize fragile states in a complex
disaster. Second, the group aimed to review the Joint Staff,
J6/7 efforts to enhance CIV-MIL Information Sharing (CMIS)
through standardization within the Mission Partner Environ-
ment and Federated Mission Network.
North Korean regional and local governance structures would
be minimally effective or cooperative, and highly suspicious of
external intervention.
The combined effect of these conditions would likely result in a
tremendously high demand on military capabilities and capac-
ities that could be delivered in the inherent security and envi-
ronmental conditions. However, an increased military presence
might play into the long-term propaganda about foreign aggres-
sion. The scope of the relief effort would likely exceed our ROK
allies’ capacity, as they focus on internal requirements south of
the current demilitarized zone (DMZ). US policy states that
the USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is
usually the lead implementer for DoS, while DoD is in support.
However, in this scenario, DOD should expect and anticipate
to assume a larger role, and initially may be the U.S. lead federal
agency due to the scope, complexity, and extended duration of
the required engagement.