ist group . USAID is conducting many community efforts focused on Countering Violent Extremism ( CVE ) in hotspots . At present , the sense of political will to energize CVE efforts is absent . BH is an existential threat to the way African states governed these marginalized regions . The population witnessed BH ’ s challenges to the government , and they will force change over years , potentially creating a generational humanitarian crisis . Government response to extremist actions often becomes the tipping point for many to join extremist groups , thus partners must be synched in their messaging to quell future extremist recruitment .
Counterterrorism ( CT ) targeting and intelligence ( intel ) sharing are two primary roles of the Intelligence Community ( IC ) in WoG efforts . However , the IC is uniquely placed to identify responsible leaders and decisions-makers , especially when elected and appointed officials are only figure heads , which is extremely important for WoG capacity building efforts . In Nigeria , interagency cooperation is limited and intel service operates totally separately from the military on CT cases . The Nigerian military and the Department of State Services ( Nigerian intel ) needs to regularly share CT intel , which was highlighted by the two agencies recently capturing a West African ISIS operative . U . S . assistance is needed to coordinate the efforts of the fractured and unpredictable bureaucracies of the Lake Chad countries . IC intel products and briefs to Washington and policymakers are essential for providing context for decision-makers to understand the BH and ISIS challenges . The IC ’ s framing of the problem focuses on the bigger picture , such as how challenges in Nigeria affect the entire region . IC assessments may be the only time policymakers actually focuses on Nigeria , and thus this input influences the guidance and strategic direction of WoG efforts . The IC conducts largely impartial assessments and examines data from a distance , rather than a field operator ’ s view , as the IC has sufficient capability to broadly assess problem sets from a regional perspective . The IC plays a valuable role in small incremental changes in the environment , which have a more regional affect , thus potentially precipitating a change in the U . S government approach . The IC has brought a Whole of Intelligence Community ( WoIG ) effort to bear on the BH problem , for example , Treasury focusing on sanctions and terrorist finance . The U . S . effort pressures Nigeria to follow suit . The MNJTF responses are adaptive to similar conflicts in Africa , such as
Panel Session - U . S . Interests in Africa : the Next Ten Years Panel Chair COL Ken Adgie Deputy Commandant , U . S . Army War College provides the opening comments to panel members AMB Phillip Carter III , Retired Executive Vice President , Jefferson Waterman International and Kate Almquist Knopf Director , Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Somalia and Mali , as these responses are distinguished by the forward leaning partners in the region .
One question posed by the audience dealt with the causality of BH being restricted to such a smaller location , while Al Shabaab has been more expansive in its reach ? BH rose out of the inequities of Nigerian society and is largely ethnically based . Although BH has brought other ethnic groups into the conflict , the BH focus is devoted to solving these inequities , which are not of interest to outside groups . ISIS West Africa is likely the longer term strategic threat , especially since ISIS West Africa is focused on recreating an alternative governance structure , so more of a threat to the viability of the Nigerian government . ISIS West Africa also distributes justice and humanitarian assistance .
Another question dealt with why the USG decided to ultimately by into the MNJTF concept , and how can this be replicated to create a similar civilian agency ? One of the greatest challenge was the capacity of the MNJTF to actually receive capacity building support . MNJFT evolved into a venue for sharing intel and coordination and cooperation . A civilian entity does not have a vested interest from the NCB partners , and focus more on sub-re-
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