Afghanistan results. For example, the massive reconstruction
and development operations involved in occupying Germany,
Italy, Japan and Korea, after which the U.S. shunted much of
these capability into the reserves, leading to the Civil Affairs
Branch, now with enough critical mass and patrons, to devel-
op and promote the sense of specialness touched upon earlier.
Perhaps most curious, and related to the absence of a Vietnam
Case Study, is the selection of the Dominican Republic inter-
vention of 1965, followed by the 1989 invasion of Panama. The
stark difference between the two leaves the reader wondering
if the Vietnam experience caused this system of denial to shift
dramatically, not simply from the U.S. Army perspective, but
perhaps also driven by the growth of broader U.S. Government,
international government, and non-governmental organizations
role in supporting post-conflict governance. What becomes
evident to the reader is a misunderstanding of the roles between
and among them as they relate to supporting or reforming
governance institutions. Indeed, the author tangentially makes
the case of a substantial shift from the 60’s to the 90’s by citing
Panama as the first example of the Powell doctrine, but this
aspect could be more fully developed.
This observation notwithstanding, War and the Art of Gover-
nance is an excellent read and any national security practitioner
would do well spending time digesting it and considering the
recommendations made as they relate to issues today and in the
future.
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