Nadia Schadlow ’ s book “ War and the Art of Governance ” comes with an impressive set of accolades , notably Retired General , now Defense Secretary James Mattis ’ endorsement on the back cover , and Scholar-General cum National Security Advisor H . R . McMaster , as a reviewer of the pre-publication draft . Such endorsements make the book not only timely , but notably relevant to anyone wishing to gain insight into the views of today ’ s most senior national security leaders as they relate to the military ’ s role in governance .
Analyzing a range of cases from Mexico in the 1840s to Iraq and Afghanistan in the 21st Century , Schadlow convincingly argues that the U . S . Army must look beyond merely fighting and winning our nations wars . Arguing that “ in all its significant military interventions in the past , the U . S . Army has faced the need to shape the political outcome of the war .”( P3 ) In other words , victory is not assured through signing a surrender document , armistice , or peace treaty ; the most important work comes after that , and the army should be prepared , and tasked , to do the bulk of it initially , as it has done so many times in the past . Nested in this argument is the well supported assertion that successful post conflict governance is the role of the entire force , not simply a few specially trained civil affairs experts .
America ’ s enduring debate about the role of the military in governance is a result of what the author terms a “ denial syndrome ,” rooted in the country ’ s founding , where discontent over the use of British troops to control the colonies led to codifying the subordination of the military to civil control in the U . S . Constitution . This manifested itself as a consistent reluctance to embrace the use of military governments in occupied territories . The denial syndrome worked both ways with many in the U . S . Army viewing military government as merely a necessity to control the rear area , so as not to be a distraction to the main effort on the battlefield . Compounding these factors , governance tasks became increasingly pigeonholed under the purview of civil affairs experts , and considered detached from combat . As the author points out , the civil affairs community reinforced this perception , in that it advocated and emphasized how unique these skills were . “ Their emphasis on the ‘ specialness ’ of civil affairs strengthened the prevailing view of governance operations as separate and distinct from conventional war and the regular army .” ( P21 )
The preponderance of the book details the many governing experiences that the U . S . Army had throughout history . The five recommendations that track from the cases are all certainly valid , some more feasible than others given current army force structure , fiscal constraints , and political realities . Three proposals largely argue the necessity of military control of governance in post conflict environments , the other two go to the enduring need for a presence on the ground ( which cannot be wished away by leveraging technology ) and maintaining intellectual capability ( writ large , not simply as a niche capability ) to plan for and execute governance tasks .
But more surprising are some of the observations that do not directly follow through to the recommendations , for example , a consistent thirst for better guidance from Washington , which was seldom quenched , left commanders in the field to figure it out on their own . Given adequate authority however , they generally governed satisfactorily . The extent to which the U . S . Army successfully participated in governance tasks beyond public order and security is surprising , as was its effectiveness . For example , the rehabilitation and / or institution of compulsory education , that often had to strip away xenophobic or ultranationalist traditions , is consistently demonstrated as a key element to success . Schadlow notes that , in the case of Japan , the ministry of education became one of “ the most zealous proponents of democracy .”( P131 ) The Army ’ s role in rebuilding the local economy is also noteworthy in many occupations . In Post WWII Italy for example , the military instituted price controls to control inflation , reformed the tax code , and rebuilt transportation infrastructure to restore economic activity . ( P108 ) These aspects get at the fundamental reform and stabilization of a society which leads to true political victory . Noteworthy by its absence , is a Vietnam case study . Perhaps the most salient Cold War experience is only briefly touched upon as a step in the bifurcation between winning the conventional fight and “ the other war .”( P274 )
Also , while the case studies are excellent , there were events , perhaps symptomatic of Army and U . S . Government changes writ large , which possibly shaped the evolution of post conflict governance across time . Highlighting and connecting those dots may have better illustrated the system of denial , and better explained how we found ourselves with the unsatisfying Iraq and
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