renew in still-unstable countries , combatants may find the best way to gain their desired leverage is to attack their countries ’ neighbors and allies , as opposed to institutions within . Every conflict is different , but it is not uncommon for insurgent groups to conclude their countries ’ governments would fall without Western support , and that attacking Western targets is the best way to hasten this outcome . In such a situation , an individual known formerly as a domestic insurgent may become an international terrorist . Sharing identity data from the earlier conflicts will be vital to identifying such individuals during their travels .
Concerns
Although a conflict may recur in a given country , the international response to it will not necessarily repeat . Different states , organizations and coalitions will respond to each crisis according to their interests . With this degree of fluidity , identity data must be shared if information from past stability operations is to assist with planning future ones .
Ultimately , the level of trust between partners will determine the level of information sharing . One state may fear sharing identity data with an authoritarian state out of fear it would be used to oppress the enrolled population in some way . Other states might fear losing control over the distribution of their data . Cybersecurity presents another concern ; a state known to be frequently hacked may not be able to obtain information from partners fearful of data theft . The decision to share or not to share , with its potential effect on military operations and border security , can be interpreted as a subtle , but pointed “ soft power ” tool in which identity information is analogous to a trade agreement or technology exchange . Sharing of identify data between international partners exemplifies the degree of trust between partners .
Though they may disagree on policy , international partners are generally stable countries . Host nations with recurring internal conflict cannot say the same . Sharing identity data with such unstable states introduces the risk of reprisals , both from the government and the armed opposition . An unscrupulous state may use identity data from its foreign partners to single out minorities or political opponents for unequal treatment . If such a state is toppled and the opposition gains access to the database , it may use identity data to identify former members of the defunct government and exact revenge .
As Glenn Voelz ( 2016 ) indicates from past U . S . experience , “ Counterinsurgency strategy … called for U . S . forces to help reestablish rule of law and support local governance . This included the transfer of biometric information and technologies
Figure 4 : Border authorities can use biometric authentication to prevent entry by terrorists and criminals presenting fraudulent documents .
to local partners , as well as training on the utilization of these tools as part of legal proceedings .” 15 Taking full advantage of identity capabilities to this degree requires trust which may not initially exist . The refusal to share may protect the integrity of identity data , but the host nation may interpret such reluctance as a perception of the host ’ s weakness or incompetence . In future actions , the host nation may perform down to this level of expectation . However , sharing of sensitive identity information with a host government is not just an operational decision , but a strategic one signaling international political commitment to ensuring stability , thus policymakers must choose wisely .
Conclusion
Conflict recurrence is not a desired outcome , but history shows it is sadly a probable one for which military planners must be prepared . As such , the absence of a major ground operation does nothing to devalue accumulated identity data . Significant evidence indicates the conflicts of tomorrow will be fought in largely the same places as today , and identity data from those areas will be vital for future conflicts . That same data provides an additional tool to protect the borders of our own country and those of our partners , and the ability to distribute this data to or withhold it from partners supplements our soft power arsenal . Additionally , enrollment in a biometric database may deter past combatants from taking up arms again .
While not exactly mature yet , the technological foundations for Identity Activities are far from new . Biometric devices and global information networks are now commonplace in the private sector , and forensic disciplines are well established in law enforcement . Military doctrine though , is still evolving . Today ’ s
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