Summary
The Department of Defense has gathered biometric and biograph-
ic data on millions of individuals in past military operations,
largely, but not exclusively in the Central Command Area of
Responsibility. Although named operations may conclude, history
and statistical analysis indicate identity data accumulated from
each operation will remain useful for decades as unstable states
fail to achieve enduring peace agreements, return to conflict, and
invite international responses. Data from past conflicts will assist
warfighters and peacekeepers with identifying friends and foes in
new operations, support international counterterror efforts, and –
speculatively – may deter enrolled members of the population from
becoming combatants in a renewed conflict.
For more than two decades now, United States service members
have conducted foot patrols through repetitive urban environ-
ments and maritime operations in unchanging seas encounter-
ing the same individuals innumerable times. Often, what is true
at the tactical level may be true at the strategic one, as well. A
brief survey of post-Cold War conflicts around the globe will re-
veal certain names again and again – names like Liberia, El Sal-
vador, Sudan, Yemen, Mali, or a better-known one like Afghan-
istan. 1 Anecdotally, military operations, from major combat to
humanitarian relief, often cluster in certain regions or countries.
Rigorous academic studies of the topic make the same case.
If U.S., allied or partner military forces operate in the same
countries repeatedly, it is likely they will interact with many of
the same inhabitants. To prepare for such future contingencies,
armed forces must retain biometric and biographic information
about the encountered individuals in order to recognize known
threats and vet trusted parties. Th e burgeoning field of Identity
Activities – and in particular, forensics and biometrics – will
help ensure the U.S. is able to meet this challenge.
Recurring Conflict
Depending on how one organizes the data (such as post-Napo-
leon, post- World War II, between states or within states), rates
of conflict recurrence range anywhere from one third 2 of all
conflicts to three quarters. 3 Of conflicts in progress today, it is a
15
Figure 1: A U.S. Marine biometrically enrolls the irises
of an Afghan national in 2014. Enrollment of combat-
ants and non-combatants denies anonymity to hostile
forces who count on their ability to blend into native
populations.
near certainty at least one will flare back up within a few years,
with South Sudan as a recent example. 4
The dominant aggravating factor is a lack of settlement from the
initial conflict. 5 If one party declares victory, but other parties
remain strong enough to contest it, then renewed war is very
likely. The most stable outcome involves an unambiguously
stronger side imposing a settlement on its weaker peers. 6 How-
ever, the very nature of peacekeeping operations implies this is
not the case. If a conflict’s outcome was truly stable, no peace-
keepers would be needed. A peacekeeping requirement implies
at least one side is both strong and motivated enough to disrupt
the peace, absent the outside force. Thus, when peacekeepers
leave – as the United States, United Nations, and other foreign
forces almost always do – there is a good chance the peace will
degrade and conflict will return.
In fact, some studies put a timetable on the resumption of war
from uncertain peace. Stephen L. Quackenbush and Jerome F.
Verlicher (2008), observed: