Berdal and David Malone (2000) argued that measures of social
grievance, such as inequality, a lack of democracy, and ethnic
and religious divisions, have little systematic effect on the risk of
civil war. 6 They assert that it is primarily financial viability; that
is greed, which motivates rebel groups. 7
Indeed, while the ‘greed’ factor is largely true in perpetuating
conflicts such as the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and
Democratic Republic of Congo, this paper argues that unlike
with civil conflicts, social grievances are greater contributing
factors to the growing threat of terrorism in Africa. In most
cases, an individual or groups’ frustration regarding perceived
deprivation (although relative), fosters aggression within an
individual or group, which can then manifest itself in the form
of political violence and terrorism.
Reflecting on the African situation, most religious groups,
ethnic minorities, lower and middle income earners and other
social groupings feel marginalized relative to the distribution
of state resources. In other words, those in authority such as
political elites control state resources, and the creation of social
classes. For instance, the Touregs in Northern Mali and North-
ern Niger feel marginalized and neglected as they benefit little
from state resources such as gold and uranium. In Senegal, the
Casamance region feels alienated from the mainstream political
administration of the state. In Nigeria, the Movement for the
Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) has persistently waged
attacks against the Nigerian state for not benefiting from the
rich oil resources in the Niger Delta. While the Bok o Haram
(BH) terrorist group in Nigeria appears to be waging a religious
war, part of BH’s grievances are the growing inequality, poverty
and marginalization perpetuated by ‘corrupt’ political elites.
Libya’s uprising in 2011 resulted in the emergence of multiple
terrorist groups, which was promulgated by grievances such as
lack of democratic space and human right abuses by the Gh-
addafi regime. These examples attest to the fact that grievances
cannot be downplayed as key motivations that can engender
groups to engage in terrorist acts.
EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS
Experiences
There is no doubt that terrorism continues to pose enormous se-
curity challenge to most African states. Since the 1998 simulta-
neously coordinated bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 8 a series of deadly attacks
were recorded in Mali, Nigeria, Libya, Kenya, and recently in
Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire among others. The effects of
these attacks have been devastating, killing scores of innocent
people and destroying key infrastructure and buildings. This
has created panic and fear among the population in Africa. In
response, states as well regional organizations made conscious
efforts at developing frameworks and devising anti-terrorism
strategies. In most cases, however, strategies become obsolete or
counter-productive because of the rapidly changing nature of
terrorist group’ strategies and tactics. Admittedly, many terror-
ist groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
al-Shabaab, BH, Ansar Dine, and Ansaru are operating across
Africa with new tactics and sophisticated equipment, which
African security agencies cannot match with outmoded tech-
niques and strategies. It is instructive to note that BH, for
example, engaged in proselytization (dawa), which included
recruitment, indoctrination, and radicalization of its members
before 2009. These were non-violent approaches to pursuing
their ideological agenda.
However, in July 2009, the Nigerian military adopted radical
counter-terrorism measures, leading to the killing of Moham-
med Yusuf, the BH moderate leader. In response, and to demon-
strate resilience, BH adopted rather violent and desperate
measures to achieve their political and ideological goals. Nige-
rian authorities failure to prosecute those who were responsible
for the extra-judicial killing of the BH leader Yusuf, constituted
one of the principal grievances of the members of the sect. 9
Consequently, the group became more violent and as noted by
Campbell:
Boko Haram [has become] brutal, fully exploiting the
propaganda value of violence. Its murder methods are grisly,
featuring throat-slitting and beheadings, which it some-
times captures on video for propaganda purposes. Initially,
most of its victims were members of the security forces,
persons associated with the government, and Muslims who
actively opposed the group. Now, however, victims include
women, children, and Muslims who merely do not actively
support its agenda. 10
As Nigeria introduces more anti and counter-terrorism mea-
sures, including amnesty negotiations, the introduction of
emergency law and the massive deployment of security forces,
Boko Haram also continues to change its tactics and strategies
causing more havoc to human lives and property in North-East-
ern Nigeria.
Kenya’s role in fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia attracted reprisal
attacks in Kenya, resulting in the 2013 attack against the West-
gate Mall in Nairobi that left at least 65 people dead. In April
2015, al-Shabaab killed 147 students in Garissa University in
Kenya. 11
10