-unities together . Interestingly , just as the money for this project was about to run out , DoD provided additional funding as it was impressed by the initiative . The last initiative was in a remote area of eastern Mali , and used local partners to bring fractured communities together .
Measuring impact of stabilization activities is quite challenging , such as proving the negative impact of programs , or determining if money spent on stabilization actually deterred enemy elements . There are metrics and frameworks that try and measure deterrence , but impact is still illusive , which is a challenge because Congress will always be interested in the impact of stabilization expenditures . Institutionalizing an effective relationship between DOD and USAID will require daily collaboration , which must then be imparted onto Congress to show the utility of collaborative stabilization efforts , especially with regard to relaxing authorities to allow such interaction to occur more freely .
Much can be learned through researching history , as there is a very large body of experience to be drawn from . A vast number of studies have focused on assessments , which can provide many valuable lessons that can be applied to current situations . Vietnam and the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development structure , commonly referred to as CORDS , provides an illustrative example for unity of effort and Unity of Command . Unity of Command arose as a challenge most recently in Iraq . History addresses the role USAID and the country team enacted to pull the US effort together into a combined program in Mindanao . The Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism ( PREACT ) program is a lesser studied area that has produced many reasonable stability recommendations , such as focusing on collecting the raw materials to ensure an accurate assessment can be made of programs , while also developing the most accurate metrics . Gathering and sharing the right information is fundamental to learning from our past experiences . The community has been working towards definitive , rigorous answers for successful and not successful stability practices , as well as the best assessment practices .
Multiple assessments show that in both Iraq and Afghanistan , the US tended to prioritize combat over the Security Force Assistance ( SFA ) mission of building new institutions . One exception was the effort to raise the Afghan local police , as an attempt to define a culturally appropriate model for local security . The US has largely prioritized tooth over tail in institutional development , and still has not developed an effective police training model , which has always been second in priority to building military institutions . The Philippine history makes a case to posit that SFA is most effective when coupled with providing operational assistance in the field to the training unit , as this provides an opportunity for advisors to accompany a real world mission and observe the effectiveness of the training . Through direct observation of operations , advisors can revise training program , while also providing long term mentoring .
Mapping out stabilization priorities is vital . Civil Security , Humanitarian Assistance , Civil Infrastructure , and essential services all need to be done with the same efficiency as security force assistance . A more refined framework for collaboration with defined roles between NGOs , IOs and the military is essential for the success of SFA missions .
Stabilization is very much a political endeavor in which DoS is directly involved in diplomacy . However , DoD and USAID need to manage the middle ground with management and oversight from state . DoS manages the middle ground through policy discussion as in Yemen , dialogue and engagement , spoiler management , and convening partners , such as the Europeans in Africa . A three dimensional model of the operational space to guide collaborative operations at the strategic , operational and tactical levels is vital for stabilization efforts . If military operations are not immediately followed by stabilization efforts , a hole is created for the reoccurrence of instability and conflict . The structure of the Army needs to be optimized to enhance IA coordination , which is actually functioning well in the field . The dynamics of military operations are now different as there is no cold start now , since there is usually some sort of USG presence already present and active in the field . The US Army is unifying efforts and focusing on integrating soft power as a war fighting function .
Peacekeeping
The second panel addressed Peace Operations opportunities , and consisted of panel members from OSD ( P ) SHA , DoS ’ s Bureau of International Organization Affairs , Joint Staff J-5 ’ s Global Policy and Partnerships Division , the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University , and a previous staff officer for the UN mission in Southern Sudan . This panel followed the same construct as the stability panel .
The strategic environment of peacekeeping operations has changed , and the UN is not designed to conduct the robust peacekeeping missions currently being undertaken in South Sudan and Central African Republic . There were 50,000 new pledges to support peacekeeping operations , which may have been facilitated by the US and the UN signing a logistical agreement , which drove down costs for the UN . UN missions serve a good strategic purpose and actually benefit the US military , in that the more available UN troops , the better the understanding
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